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“The opposite of art is not ugliness, it is indifference.”1 – Elie Wiesel 
1.0 Introduction:  
 When walking in Jerusalem one cannot help but notice the presence of political and 
religious street art. Slogans, portraits of political and religious figures, ironic political statements, 
and religious symbols are spray painted, hung, or plastered in public view. For instance, one 
artist is infamous for painting mural portraits of important public figures such as Albert Einstein 
(Image One) and Maimonides (Image Two), as well as less known minority leaders of the ultra-
orthodox or Palestinian sects (Image Three). Other artists paint verses from the Hebrew Bible, or 
spray stencils of Israeli heroes such as Moshe Dayan (Image Four) and Theodore Herzl. A well-
known graffiti tag, ‘Na Nach’ (Image Five), is used as a rally cry by a sub group of Breslover 
Hasidim2, meant to recruit Jewish people back to their traditional ways. Still another artist has 
sprayed elementary Arab words, and beneath it the Hebrew translation and phonetic spelling 
(Image Six).3  
 At first glance the city seems to be peppered with political expression originating from 
authentic roots of civil society- the artisan social commentators. However, upon reflection, one 
comes to notice that much of the paint is chipped, and the political commentary is no longer 
relevant to contemporary issues. According to Ron, a city-planning official in Jerusalem, the 
																																																								
1 Elie, Weisel. "One Must Not Forget," interview by Alvin P. Sanoff, US News and World Report, August 
27, 1986. Print.  
2 See Daniel Treiman, 2007 for more information regarding the Na Nach graffiti.  
3 See images in Appendix D 
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decline in street art (and in individually commissioned cultural pieces) can be traced back to 
around the time of the 2014 Operation Protective Edge (Gaza Conflict).4  
 It is puzzling that a population having just achieved renewed dominant status, 
simultaneously experiences a decline in private political-cultural participation, specifically 
through street art. The following question arises: does the presence of a people’s own military 
induce or reduce those same peoples’ political-cultural participation. Specifically, how did the 
increased activity of the IDF during the summer of 2014 Operation Protective Edge influence 
political-cultural street art in West Jerusalem?  
2.0 Literature Review: 
 This study is grounded in two schools of academic literature: 1) the social and political 
importance of artistic expression in the public sphere, and 2) artistic expression in times of 
conflict. In the following literature review we shall first consider the social and political 
importance of artistic expression in an effort to determine under what circumstances is street art 
an authentic expression of civil discourse and an accurate measure of public opinion. Next, we 
shall consider what happens to civil expression and public discourse through street art, in times 
of conflict.   
2.1 Artistic Expression in the Public Sphere:  
 In order to understand street art as public dialogue through artistic means, we must first 
gain a better understanding of: the public sphere, those who contribute art to the public sphere- 
the creative class, art as public dialogue, and street art as a unique form of social and political 
commentary.  
 
2.11 The Pulic Sphere   																																																								
4 Ron, in-person formal interview, 2017. 
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 In his innovative work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), 
Jürgen Habermas lays necessary foundations that define the public sphere in modern terms.5 
Habermas coins the term public sphere as the realm in which ‘something approaching public 
opinion is formed’- a place of cohabitation accessible to all members of civil society.6  
 Habermas anchors the birth of the modern (individual based) public sphere in the salons 
and coffee shops of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe.7 The concept of a public sphere 
dates back to ancient western civilizations and can be found in the words of Aristotle.8 
Habermas’ key contribution is his act of disengaging the public sphere from the representative 
authority.9 Throughout the middle ages the public sphere, though inhabited by the masses, 
belonged to the ruling class, causing the masses to define themselves and their actions in terms 
of the ruling class. Thus, prior to the reformation the public sphere was “directly linked to the 
concrete existence of a ruler.”10   
 ‘Private’ versus ‘public’ spheres only became relevant with the disintegration of feudal 
authority (triggered by the seventeenth century Protestant Reformation). Religion became a 
private matter, and the Church became just one authority among many public institutions. The 
re-public (representative public, or authoritative sphere) that previously represented the masses 																																																								
5 Charles T. Goodsell, "The Concept of Public Space and Its Democratic Manifestations," The American 
Review of Public Administration 33, no. 4 (2003): , doi:10.1177/0275074003254469; Zeina Najjar, 
Writing on the Wall: Conversations with Beirut's Street Artists, PhD diss., London School of Economics, 
2015. 
6 Charles T. Goodsell, "The Concept of Public Space and Its Democratic Manifestations," The American 
Review of Public Administration 33, no. 4 (2003): , doi:10.1177/0275074003254469; Jürgen Habermas, 
Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox. "The Public Sphere: An  Encyclopedia Article (1964)." (New German 
Critique, no. 3:1974), 49-55. doi:10.2307/487737 
7 Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011). 3-5.; Zeina 
Najjar, Writing on the Wall: Conversations with Beirut's Street Artists, PhD diss., London School of 
Economics, 2015. 7. 
8 Politics, Book II 
9 Peter Weibel, Global Activism: Art and Conflict in the 21st Century (Karlsruhe, Germany: ZKM, Center 
for Art and Media, 2015).48-49 
10 Jürgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox. "The Public Sphere: An  Encyclopedia Article 
(1964)." (New German Critique, no. 3:1974). 51 
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became obsolete to large segments of the population. And so the liberal (modern) public sphere 
formed as “an all inclusive site of un-coerced discussion and opinion formation, a place that 
transcends politics, commerce, private interests, and even state control”11  
2.12 Inhabiting the Public Sphere 
 As defined above, the body of the public sphere is understood as comprising of a 
collective of individual members of civil society- a public grouping of private citizens, actions, 
expressions, etc. For the purposes of this study we will consider those members of civil society 
who practice artistic expression within the confines of the public sphere as artisan social 
commentators (loosely related to members of the creative class).  
 Author Richard Florida, in his book, The Rise of the Creative Class (2006), introduces 
the notion of a creative-class. The creative-class is considered to be those groups of individuals 
who contribute innovation, creativity, and technological advancement, correlating with rapid 
economic growth, which in turn adds momentum to cultural development.12 This concept of a 
creative-class is not directly applicable to the study at hand seeing as not all members of the 
creative class are artists, and not all artists are members of the creative class. Indeed Florida 
applies his concept of the creative class to members of the professional sphere in post-
industrialized societies and is more concerned with the creative class’s influential role in the 
social distribution of economic resources. Still, Florida’s argument is useful in highlighting some 
of the characteristics of the modern urban artists: their motivations, habitat, and behavioral 
patterns. Of particular relevance is Florida’s attempt to consider and define those members of 
society who foster and contribute culture, through innovation, artistic creation, and public 
																																																								
11 W. J. T. Mitchell, Art and the Public Sphere (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.).3 
12 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How Its Transforming Work, Leisure, 
Community and Everyday Life (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006). 
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expression. This study will apply the concept of the creative class to define those artisan social 
commentators fostering culture through public artistic expression in Jerusalem.   
 As mentioned above, the public sphere is a space that transcends political, economic, and 
private interests. It is important therefore to discuss what it means if an artist’s public expression 
is practiced in collaboration with political, religious, or commercial institutions. For instance, if 
an artist either applies for a government grant, or is nominated through committee selection, to 
contribute works of art to the public sphere- is that work of art an authentic voice of the artists in 
a public sphere? On the one hand, the involvement of the governing authority in producing the 
artistic expression, calls into questions the authenticity of the public expression as the artist’s 
individual contribution. On the other hand, the artist’s compliance, and in some cases desire, to 
collaborate with the governing authority is arguably an authentic aspect of the artist’s expression. 
 Penny Bach reconciles this dilemma by constructing the concept of the artist-citizen. 
According to Bach the artist-citizen works with the various social institutions (be they 
governmental, religious, commercial, or private) to bring art into public space. The following 
excerpt best represents Bach’s argument that artist-citizens work can be regarded as authentic 
public expressions so long as they spark individual reflection and productive public discourse:  
The integrity of the artist is brought by a wholeness brought by the artist [sic.] to 
the public art project; it is not determined by it. Creative inquiry, supported by the 
artist’s rich sense of exploration and experience over time, informs the public art 
process. It cannot be protected; it is intrinsic. The integrity of the process is 
reflected by a soundness of method, one that articulates and interprets the goals of 
the project is open to change and variation, creates a sense of agreement between 
the goals of the artist and those of the community, and empowers the public by 
identifying opportunities for discourse and discovery.13  
Bach argues that by infusing public spaces with meaningful artistic content, the artist-citizen 
creates opportunity for individual spectators to engage in meaningful public discourse. 																																																								
13 Penny Bach, Art for the Public, (New Collaborations: Dayton Art Institute: 1988). 11-19. 
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Ultimately, it is at the discretion of the artist to preserve the authenticity of their voice and the 
wholesome nature of their work, while working with communities and institutions. In 
conclusion, Bach argues, “we ought to place the highest value on the integrity of the artist who 
helps us see, think, respond, and react to the elements of our time and space.”14 By trusting the 
integrity of each individual artist, we might understand artists-institutional collaborations (such 
as with government organizations) as authentic expressions of the artist’s perceptions of society.  
2.13 Art and Politics:   
“The opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.” 
- (G. Orwell, 1946) 
 Murray Edelman presents a comprehensive theoretical argument defining the scope of 
what he believes is the complex causal relationship between art and politics; all art is relevant 
(and in one way or another, influences) the political sphere. According to Edelman, “art is the 
fountainhead from which political discourse, beliefs about politics, and consequent actions 
ultimately spring.”15 Edelman argues that the social sciences, and political science in particular, 
must consider artistic expression as a real influence on a society’s political and cultural opinions 
and ideology.16 The following section will consider several links between art and politics: art as 
iconographic propaganda, composing collective narratives, preserving collective memory, and 
critical social-political reflection through art and humor.   
 One circumstance in which art and politics interact is in cases of propaganda, 17 
iconography, and religious, political, or cultural symbolism. In the following passage, Read 
considers art as a tool for reinforcing ethnic, cultural, and political ideology. According to 																																																								
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Murray Jacob Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003).iii 
17 It is important here to distinguish between propaganda in general, and government sponsored 
propaganda.  
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Herbert Read, “it is characteristic of such works of art [religious, political iconography or 
idolatry] that they are not disinterested creations…”18 In fact, these religious and political 
iconographies utilize visual expression and symbolism to communicate, thereby reinforcing an 
idea or set of beliefs.19 Mia Gröndahl demonstrates this argument in her piece, ‘Gaza Graffiti’, in 
which she explores the role of religious calligraphy-based street art in Gaza as a means of 
propagating political affiliation.20 In this instance the art serves as a form of idolatry or symbolic 
propaganda; the substantive content of the iconography is therefor the coercive factor, whereas 
the medium of expression is simply the material form of relation.  
  While public (and private) art play a role in inspiring nationalism, composing narrative, 
and preserving collective memory, artistic expression can also serve the purpose of critiquing the 
establishment. “The explicitly critical, disruptive, or satiric work may, at certain moments, open 
up a site of public experience that approximates universal inclusiveness and collective 
emotion.”21 In this passage Mitchell describes how public art can, through satire and humor, 
break down social barriers and prompt interactions in the public space. The satirical and 
disruptive nature of the social commentary invites spectators to the discussion, while the political 
or social content reinforces social ties, and strengthens collective emotion.  
 American comedian, Will Ferrell, in his 2017 commencement address to the graduates of 
the University of Southern California, considers just how his art acts as this form, “my role on 
this show, Saturday Night Live, is to hold up a mirror to our political leaders and engage in 
																																																								
18 Herbert Read. Art and Society (New York: Schocken Books: 1996). 21 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mia Gröndahl, Gaza Graffiti: Messages of Love and Politics (Cairo: American University in Cairo 
Press, 2009). 
21 W. J. T. Mitchell, Art and the Public Sphere (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.). 19 
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satirical reflection.”22 The public sphere allows the artist to play an integral role in providing 
satirical reflection of political realities.     
2.14 Street Art: Definitions and Scholarly Contributions:  
“Street art, in essence, connotes a decentralized, democratic form in which there is universal access, and the real 
control of messages comes from the social producers. It is a barometer that measures the spectrum of thinking.” 
- (Chaffee, 1993: 4) 
 This study will use the terms ‘street art’ and ‘graffiti’ interchangeably. The main reason 
to distinguish between street art and graffiti is to ensure that no ‘non-art’ will mistakenly be 
considered in the analysis. But the line between graffiti that is art and graffiti that is not art is 
widely contested in both social science and art history disciplines seeing as an empirical 
distinction would require an accepted definition of the term art in and of itself.23 In the interest of 
not falling down the rabbit hole of a centuries old debate24, this study will consider all public 
scratchings25 contributed by members of the creative class as viable data points for analysis.  
 Since the rise of urban graffiti in the 1960s an increasing number of social science studies 
have considered street art as a measure of public [often times political] opinion.26 The argument 
for urban street art as a legitimate vehicle of political, social, or personal expression is rooted in a 
body of literature that considers art a social commentary and/or propagation of a certain ideology 
or opinion.27 According to one study, “[graffiti] provide[s] accurate indicators of local attitudes 
																																																								
22 Will Ferrell, 2017 
23 Rafael Schacter, "An Ethnography of Iconoclash," Journal of Material Culture 13, no. 1 (2008). 
24 For more information on the history of the scholarly debate concerning the definition of art please refer 
to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Definition of Art” 
25 The term graffiti originates from the Italian ‘graffito’- an ancient term used to characterize the 
scratchings on the city walls (arguably to first forms of graffiti).  
26 Klingman and Shalev, 2001. Visconti, Sherry, Borghini, and Anderson, 2010. Waldner and Dobratz, 
2013 
27 Murray Jacob Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003).  
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and social process in areas where more direct measurement is difficult.”28 In other words, 
through graffiti and street art spectators may gain an authentic understanding of the social and 
political realities of any given society.  
 Lyman Chaffee’s analysis of street art in Latin America, echoes this sentiment and 
highlights the importance of democratic contexts in which street art should be created, in order to 
ensure an authentic representation of civil society’s true opinions. As quoted from Chaffee, 
“Street art, in essence, connotes a decentralized, democratic form in which there is universal 
access, and the real control of messages comes from the social producers. It is a barometer that 
measures the spectrum of thinking.”29 Chaffee highlights the relationship between democratic 
contexts and free, public expression. Notably, in democratic contexts, control of the content of 
the messages is in the hands of the ‘social producers’, or civil society. Therefor, street art, when 
interpreted in democratic contexts, is an authentic measure of public opinion.  
 Building on this literature, international scholars have analyzed urban street art in 
ethnically or nationally contested areas in order to gain insight into a certain conflict, territorial, 
or social dominance.30 These scholars, and others, highlight the use of religious, cultural, 
historical, and ethnic symbols, relevant to the region, in deciphering political affiliation.31 The 
use of symbolism and iconography in street art builds on the previous discussion (see section 																																																								
28 Ley, David, and Roman Cybriwsky. "Urban Graffiti as Territorial Markers." Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 64, no. 4 (1974): 491-505,  
29 Lyman G. Chaffee, Political Protest and Street Art: Popular Tools for Democratization in Hispanic 
Countries (Westport, Conn. U.a.: Greenwood Press, 1993). 4 
30 Faye Docuyanan, "Governing Graffiti in Contested Urban Spaces," PoLAR: Political Html_ent 
Glyph="@amp;" Ascii=""/ Legal Anthropology Review 23, no. 1 (2000): doi:10.1525/pol.2000.23.1.103; 
Zia Krohn, andJoyce Lagerweij. “Concrete Messages: Street Art on the Israeli-Palestinian Separation 
Barrier.” (Dokument Press: 2010); Craig Larkin, “Jerusalem’s Separation Wall and Global Message 
Board: Graffiti, Murals, and the Art if Sumud.” (The Arab Studies Journal 22, 1: 2014); Ley, David, and 
Roman Cybriwsky. "Urban Graffiti as Territorial Markers." Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 64, no. 4 (1974). 
31 Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, Shared Land/conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and 
Palestinian Symbol Use (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003); Zoghbi, Pascal, Stone, 
and Joy Hawley. Arabic graffiti = Ghirāfītī ʻArabīyah. Berlin: From Here to Fame, 2013. Print. 
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2.13) that considers the role of art in cultivating, enforcing, or influencing a dominant collective 
narrative.  
2.2 Arts and Culture in Times of Conflict: 
 In the previous section we defined civil societies’ self-determined public street art as 
instances of authentic social or political dialogue. In the following section we will consider 
literature discussing the nature of this dialogue when those members of the civil society and/or 
the public sphere in which they inhabit, experiences conflict.     
2.21 Artistic Expression as Resistance  
“Because it can be ahead of general opinion, art becomes controversial at such times, and in some measure becomes 
symbolic of rebellion and dissent.”  
- (Edelman, 1995: 20) 
 Public art produced during times of oppression and/or revolution has become a popular 
theme in modern art history, psychology, sociology, and political science literatures. Some case 
studies focus on social revolution, or activism, including the posters, museum exhibitions, poetry 
etc. associated with the feminist movement that took place in the United States in the late 
twentieth century, and still continues today. For instance, the Guerrilla Girls movement founded 
in New York City, in 1985,32 or the mass reproductions of “Rosie the Riveter” poster are classic 
examples of culture jamming (a tactic meant to subvert mainstream media and foster progressive 
social change).33 More recent works include graffiti by Russian artist, Mikaela, who applies a 
stencil graffiti technique to spray portraits of revolutionary female figures.34  
 Within this broad literature is a series of studies that focus exclusively on the politically 
(culturally, ethnically, or nationally) oppressed and their efforts to subvert dominance through 																																																								
32 guerrillagirls.com  
33 Todd Tietchen, "Language out of Language: Excavating the Roots of Culture Jamming and Postmodern 
Activism from William S. Burroughs Nova Trilogy," Discourse 23, no. 3 (2001): , 
doi:10.1353/dis.2001.0025. 
34 Mikaela, Narodniki Women, 2013, graffiti series- Peter Weibel, Global Activism: Art and Conflict in 
the 21st Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014). 
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artistic expression. In this case, art serves multiple purposes: a communicative purpose (similar 
to the culture jamming cited above), a therapeutic purpose,35 heritage preservation, 36and in many 
cases, represents acts of revolt.37  
 In his seminal works, Domination and the Art of Resistance, and Weapons of the Weak, 
James C. Scott discusses his theories of subaltern forms of resistance in which he describes 
everyday attempts to deter colonialism and extreme oppression. According to Scott, colonized 
and oppressed segments of society subvert the dominant power through composing a ‘hidden 
transcript.’38 The ‘hidden transcript’ is comprised of different elements of culture, from distinct 
garb, to cultural stories, theatrical productions, and material works of art.   
 A robust literature considers street art a unique form of resistance, often employed by 
oppressed peoples for the purpose of resistance and/or revolution.39 Some of these studies 
interpret graffiti as an example of what James Scott describes as a ‘hidden transcript.’40 Other 
studies go so far as to consider the street art of revolutions to be distinctly public (as opposed to 
																																																								
35 Avigdor Klingman and Ronit Shalev, "Graffiti," Youth & Society 32, no. 4 (2001): , 
doi:10.1177/0044118x01032004001. 
36 Read, Herbert. Art and Society. London: Heinemann, 1937; Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, 
Shared Land/conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2003). 
37 Gillard, Colleen, and Georgia Wells. "The Art of the Revolution." The Atlantic, May 9, 2011. Accessed 
September 28, 2017, Sanders, Lewis. "Reclaiming the City: Street Art of the Revolution." In Translating 
Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir, edited by Mehrez Samia, 143-82. American University in 
Cairo Press, 2012.  
38 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. (Yale University Press, 
2008). 
39 Lewis Sanders, "Reclaiming the City: Street Art of the Revolution." In Translating Egypt’s Revolution: 
The Language of Tahrir, edited by Mehrez Samia, 143-82. American University in Cairo Press, 2012; 
Peter.Weibel, Global Activism: Art and Conflict in the 21st Century. Cambridge: MIT Press: 2014); 
Robert Chadwell Williams. Artists in Revolution: Portraits of the Russian Avant-garde, 1905- 1925. 
(London: Scolar Press, 1978). 
40 Lisa K. Waldner, and Betty A Dobratz.. "Graffiti as a Form of Contentious Political Participation." 
(Sociology Compass 7.5, 2013: 377-89).   
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hidden).41 In either case, the conflict is directly linked to the increased production of street art. 
Two such examples include: Lyman Chaffee’s study of political protest through street art in 
Hispanic countries,42 and Lewis Sanders IV (among many other scholars) analysis of the surge in 
street art in-and-around Tahrir Square during the Egyptian Revolution, in 2011.43 In both of these 
cases the authors define the production of street art as a response to conflict. The authors go so 
far as to argue that the commandeering of public space through art can be considered an act of 
resistance. 
2.22 Artistic Expression Originating from Members of the Dominant Society 
 While there is a plethora of scholarship concerning artistic expression (specifically street 
art) as a form resistance, there is a dearth of literature considering what happens to the dominant 
creative class’s artistic expressions in times of conflict. Even the concept of ‘dominant artistic 
expression’ (artistic expressions that originate from the dominant, or sovereign segment of 
society) is grossly understudied in academic literatures. For instance, Sanders does recognize the 
‘dominant’ narrative expressed through public artistic means, in the opening statements of his 
journal article.44 However he goes on to focus his piece solely on the street art originating from 
the marginalized and oppressed segment of society in terms of acts of resistance (against the 
dominant narrative). This is not to say that studying the artistic expressions of the subaltern class 
during times of conflict is in any way irrelevant. Indeed, at first glance it would seem that the 
street art of successful revolutions must be combed in an effort to identify which strengths led to 
the subaltern’s successful resilience and revolt. This is to say though that there is a blatant lack of 																																																								
41 Lewis Sanders, "Reclaiming the City: Street Art of the Revolution." In Translating Egypt’s Revolution: 
The Language of Tahrir, edited by Mehrez Samia, 143-82. American University in Cairo Press, 2012 
42 Lyman G. Chaffee, Political Protest and Street Art: Popular Tools for Democratization in Hispanic 
Countries (Westport, Conn. U.a.: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
43 Lewis Sanders, "Reclaiming the City: Street Art of the Revolution." In Translating Egypt’s Revolution: 
The Language of Tahrir, edited by Mehrez Samia, 143-82. American University in Cairo Press, 2012144 
44 Ibid. 143 
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scholarly attention paid to modern day civil allegiance through artistic expression (in our case 
street art) with a dominant narrative, specifically when that dominant society is participating in 
conflict. This study seeks to fill this gap by surveying the nature of dominant artistic expression 
in times of conflict.  
 Though there is insufficient literature surveying dominant artistic expression in times of 
conflict, one may intuit based on the aforementioned literature, that a healthy dominant, 
democratic society would experience an increase in public artistic expression, especially in times 
of conflict. This artistic expression may either align, or reject the dominant narrative; in either 
case one, would think public expression, as a whole would increase. For instance, (as discussed 
above) public artistic expression plays an important role in enforcing a society’s collective 
memory. One might expect that as a dominant society grows stronger in a conflict, members of 
that society seek to define their collective narrative through increasing public expression in 
allegiance with the establishment. Alternatively, one may expect that as a dominant side grows 
stronger, members of the dominant society who do not agree with the establishment’s actions are 
more likely to publicly voice their opinions, especially in a democratic setting.45 For instance, 
Mark Twain considers acts of patriotism to be act out of loyalty to one’s country, not allegiance 
with one’s government, or ruling party.46 “You see my kind of loyalty was loyalty to ones 
country, not to its institutions or its officeholders.”47 With this definition of national loyalty in 
mind then even critical political commentary can be understood as originating from the 
																																																								
45 Ibid. 
46 Zinn, Howard. "Artists in Times of War." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 9.1,  2007: 
<https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1033> 
47 Samuel L Clemens. A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthurs Court, Irvine, CA: Saddleback Educational 
Publishing, 2011. Print. 64 
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dominants’ patriotic ideology.48 Harris and Sherman’s Narratives of Dissent is one example in 
which Israeli society increase opposition rhetoric through public artistic expression as a direct 
response to the increasing IDF presence in Lebanon (post 1978). In this case, increased conflict 
correlates with increasing grassroots public artistic participation on behalf of the ‘dominant’ 
Israeli society.  
 When Societies Go Silent- A Cultural Lull 
 Indeed, one may expect a dominant society would increase public artistic participation at 
the grassroots level, during times of conflict. It is curious then that an official from the Jerusalem 
municipality would make the observation that grassroots public artistic participation declined 
around Operation Protective Edge during summer, 2014.49 Furthermore, explains the same 
Municipality official, the Jerusalem Municipality, in response to the decline in grassroots public 
artistic expression, has launched multiple campaigns and programs geared towards catalyzing 
artistic expression (regardless of content).50  
 The following section shall consider why artisan creative class social commentators from 
the dominant society may go silent during times of conflict. First we shall consider instances of 
a-political state sponsorship of public artistic participation as an indicator that the artisan social 
commentators of that society have gone silent. Next, we shall consider two arguments that 																																																								
48 Zinn, Howard. "Artists in Times of War." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 9.1,  2007: 
<https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1033> 
49 City Planning Official 1, personal communication 
50 Here it is important to note that these state-sponsorships of the arts differ from government sponsored-
propaganda both in their purpose and terms of cooperation. Government-sponsored propaganda serves a 
particular purpose- to reinforce a dominant narrative. The terms of the government commissioned artwork 
are clear: the artists will receive compensation in exchange for creating artwork that pledges allegiance 
(or reinforces) the dominant national, or ideological narrative. Scholars and private citizens alike consider 
this sort of government behavior to be a method of coercion, corrupt in nature and illegitimate in practice. 
But separate from political propaganda, government organizations may sponsor artworks in order to 
catalyze economic productivity, or social participation. These commissions are offered under more broad 
terms compared to propaganda commissions and serve a clear purpose other than to influence a particular 
social narrative. More importantly, these initiatives may indicate that the targeted society has gone silent. 
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highlight the relationship between silent artisan social commentators and conflict in a dominant 
society.  
 One way to identify a society lacking an adequate grassroots public expression is to 
evaluate how much government organizations provide (with the clear intent to catalyze public 
artistic expression) a-political incentives to private artists to increase artistic expression in that 
society. Two such cases include: The Federal Project Number One under the Work Progress 
Administration (WPA) relief effort during the Great Depression, and present day efforts on 
behalf of Iraqi security forces to incentivize creative endeavors, are two examples of government 
commissioned arts in response to their silent societies. 
 The Federal Project Number One under the Work Progress Administration (WPA) 
funding for the arts is an example of a government attempting to catalyze a dormant creative 
class. United State’s sponsorship of the arts specifically did not curate the content of the 
sponsored art. President Roosevelt wrestled with the implication of ideologically unconstrained 
state-sponsorship of the arts. “Roosevelt replied that he was interested in government 
sponsorship of the arts but didn’t want “a lot of young enthusiasts painting Lenin’s head on the 
Justice Building.”51 In the end, Roosevelt decided in favor of state-sponsored art. Roosevelt’s 
decision in favor or state-sponsored art, despite his hesitations concerning the potential anti-
American sentiments that might ensue, is evidence that his motives were not political, nor 
ideational in nature.   
 A close examination of recent efforts on behalf of a joint initiative between the Iraqi 
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Culture indicate that the Iraqi public has gone silent. 
																																																								
51 Power and Patronage: State-Sponsored Art in the 1930s, The Parish Art Museum, 1995. Print. 34 
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Kendall Bianchi discusses this in her article, ‘Why Iraqi Forces Are Promoting the Arts.’52 
Bianchi argues that the Iraqi forces are investing in this initiative in effort to boost the general 
moral of civil society, in the hopes that this will boost moral in Iraqi troops. Grassroots public 
artistic participation had sustained healthy levels since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Culture noticed a decrease in free artistic expression 
around the same time that ISIS swept through Mosul, in 2014. In this case, the joint government-
ministry initiative may be an indication that Iraqi society has gone silent.  
 Societies may go silent for several reasons. Jutta Vinzent argues that in times of conflict 
each party in the conflict perceives itself as an oppressed collective: 
“… something might have been dominant, but has, for whatever reason, become 
precarious; likewise, the dominant can be actor and brands something as 
precarious, probably something that is considered dangerous; thus it becomes 
unsecured, unstable, perilous and fragile.”53  
 
A spectator may perceive a society to be dominant based on past realities. However, any society 
(dominant or oppressed) experiencing conflict perceives itself in a precarious (fragile) state. This 
concept may be applied to Israeli society in Jerusalem during Operation Protective Edge. In this 
case, Israeli society in Jerusalem is perceived by the world to have achieved dominant status both 
prior to and throughout the operation. Once Israeli society enters into conflict (Operation 
Protective Edge) the collective perception of Israeli society’s perception of itself relative to 
Hamas and Fatah changes from status from dominant to fragile.  
 Vinzent’s theories of a society perceiving itself as precarious during times of conflict 
explain the perceived silence of Israeli artisan’s during Operation Protective Edge. For the sake 																																																								
52 Bianchi, Kendall. “Why Iraqi Security Forces Are Promoting the Arts.” Foreign Affairs, 18 Sep. 2017, 
Web. 
53 Vinzent, Jutta. Precarious Spaces – Precarious Times: Commercial Exhibition Cultures in Times of 
Conflict, excerpt from the official application to the Max Weber Center, n.d., 
www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/historyofart/vinzent- projektskizze.pdf Accessed 15 
Oct. 2017. 
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of argument we shall assume the Jerusalem Municipality official is correct in his observation that 
Israeli artisan social commentators went silent during the summer 2014 conflict. Then applying 
Vinzent’s logic, one would expect Israeli artisan society to resume public expression once the 
tide of the conflict turned clearly in their favor.  
 Another reason societies may go silent is that an authoritative figure is coercing civil 
society away from expressing their opinions in public. For instance, Lisa Wedeen, in her work 
Ambiguities of Domination, observes the ‘coercive apparatus.’54 According to Wedeen dominant 
(in Wedeen’s case, authoritarian) regimes will use art as a coercive tool to reinforce political 
ideology. Similarly, art history and political science literature on early to mid-twentieth century 
Soviet Art is quick to attribute the dominant-narrative based artistic expressions to coercion by 
state means.55 Wedeen continues to argue that the state propaganda coerces society into silence, 
due either to fear, intimidation, or lack of spirit.  
 More relevant to this study is Eva Bellin’s theory of authoritarian coercion on behalf of a 
military apparatus.56 According to Bellin the extent of authoritarian coercion can be measured 
through a military’s capacity for violence, as well as their will to enforce policy through physical 
force (such as shooting or beating). The Israeli military and security apparatus coopts public 
space during times of violent conflict. In coopting public space the Israeli military and security 
apparatus coerces the creative class out of producing public art. This is a fear-based model of 
coercion.57  
																																																								
54 Lisa Wedeen. Ambiguities of Domination Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria: With 
a New Preface. (The University of Chicago Press, 2015) 
55 Robert Chadwell Williams. Artists in Revolution: Portraits of the Russian Avant-garde, 1905- 1925. 
(London: Scolar Press, 1978). 
56 Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): doi:10.2307/4150140. 
57 At this point it is imperative the reader understand I am not suggesting Israel is an authoritarian state. I 
am drawing on Bellin’s study, as I believe she presents a useful approach to measuring military 
	 21	
3.0 Hypothesis:  
1. Increase in military presence in Jerusalem correlates with a decrease in dominants’ public 
artistic expression. In effect, I expect that the creative class will go silent.  
2. The relationship between the increase in military and security dominance and decrease in 
creative class street art can be explained using the fear-based coercion model.  
Based on the results of the first test this study shall consider the following: 
a. If street arts trends increase during times of conflict this study shall reject 
Hypothesis 1. 
b. If street art trends decrease during times of conflict we shall move on to testing 
the fear-based model in Hypothesis 2.  
4.0 Outline: 
 The second chapter of my thesis presents a comprehensive background on the Israeli 
military and security apparatus. First this chapter expands on the theoretical foundations of 
dominance in terms of military and security capacity and will. Next this chapter discusses the 
history of Israel’s military and security apparatuses, from the time of the British Mandate, 
through the War of 1967. The final section of this chapter focuses on the Operation Protective 
Edge in summer 2014 and the Knifing Intifada in Jerusalem, 2014 to 2016. This section analyzes 
the increase in Israeli security and military apparatus dominance during this period.  
 In the third chapter of my thesis I shall test to see if the increase in military tension and 
presence during Operation Protective Edge (summer 2014), as described in chapter two, 
correlates with a significant increase or decrease in street art creation. I am measuring street art 
creation based on an image archive I am building (see section 5.0 Research Methodology for 																																																																																																																																																																																		
dominance (in terms of capacity and will). This study is centered on a puzzle of why would Israeli artists 
go silent during a time of conflict, given that they have freedom of expression. This assumes Israel is a 
democratic nation. This study, in its entirety, recognizes the State of Israel as a democratic nation.   
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further explanation). After testing this correlation I move on to discussing the accuracy of a fear-
based model of coercion in explaining a cultural lull and creative class silence during 2014-2016. 
I test the accuracy of the fear-based model against qualitative evidence in the form of interviews 
that I conducted within the context of this study.  
 The fourth chapter of my thesis presents a background on culture in West Jerusalem. This 
chapter shall draw on archival, anecdotal, and scholarly sources to describe public art and culture 
in West Jerusalem from the end of the second intifada (February 2005) until the beginning of 
Operation Protective Edge (summer 2014). I hope to understand the causal connection between 
the correlations I have discovered. I shall reference a series of interviews with a selection of 
Jerusalem street artists, private cultural non-for-profit organizations, and Jerusalem Municipality 
officials. Through this qualitative analysis I seek to gain a better understanding of the street 
artists’ experiences prior to, during, and post Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada.  
 The final chapter will discuss the extendibility of my findings to other society’s post 
conflict relations between military forces and artistic classes.  
5.0 Research Methodology: 
5.1 Image Archive: 
 In order to test my Hypothesis 1 I am building an image archive of West Jerusalem street 
art; catalogued according to the (approximate) time period the street art was created 
(‘approximate date created’). In order to build this archive I spent four weeks at the end of 
summer 2017 in West Jerusalem photographing street art and tracking down various artists’ 
private image libraries of street art in Jerusalem. The image archive will be used in chapter three 
in order to determine if there was a cultural lull, if the creative class did indeed go silent, 
between 2014 and 2016. 
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 I have chosen to follow a method developed at the Digital Gallatin laboratory at NYU 
both to collect new data, and aggregate the private image archive libraries, onto a digital map. 
This method was developed specifically in order to investigate the relationship between street art 
and politics. The process uses Fulcrum software to capture and store the geo-location and picture 
of each data point. To date I have knowledge of over 2,000 images from four different sources 
(including my own collection); 261 of which (the data points I photographed during my stay in 
Jerusalem). Please refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion on the graffiti data collection; 
the methods used in this study as associated limitations.  
5.2 Interviews: 
 While in Jerusalem I also conducted five interviews with West Jerusalem-based street 
artists, two interviews with staff members working for Mekudeshet (a cultural non-for-profit 
working to increase grass roots culture in Jerusalem), one interview with a staff member at the 
Jerusalem Foundation, and one interview with a Cultural Officer from the Eden initiative, an arm 
of the Jerusalem Development Authority. In addition to these formal interviews I also gathered 
qualitative, anecdotal data, through informal conversation with Jerusalem residents and members 
of the Jerusalem street art community.   
 My interview method included snowball sampling and open-ended interviews. Where 
there were a few people who I initially wanted to contact, those people introduced me to more 
interview subjects. Here is a sample of questions I asked all interview subjects.  
Interview Questions: 
- How long have you considered yourself a street artist? 
- Do you have a specific message, or a general observation? 
- Where and when do you choose to do your street art?  
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- Why is street art your chosen form of expression? 




The Contested Space of Jerusalem and Israeli Military and Security Dominance 
1.0 Introduction: 
 The following chapter argues that the Israeli military and security apparatuses are 
dominant in the physical space of West Jerusalem and surrounding territories. There are many 
ways to evaluate Israeli dominance in Jerusalem. Some scholars revert to the traditional method 
and consider Israeli dominance through the political development of the conflict (Dumper, 2014, 
Gilbert, 1998, Tessler, 2009). These works often start with the Balfour Declaration (1917), and 
describe the UN Partition Plan in 1947, the Knesset passing the Jerusalem Bill in 1980, to the 
Oslo Accords signed in 1993.  
 This study is particularly concerned with evaluating Israeli dominance over the physical 
pubic space in Jerusalem, through military and security presence. Therefore this section focuses 
on those military conflicts involving Jewish Israelis that directly concern the fight to shift and 
subsequently maintain the status of Israeli territorial dominance over Jerusalem, primarily West 
Jerusalem. This chapter refrains from providing broader context for the conflict at large 
(meaning beyond the scope of the fight for Jerusalem) except in cases where absolutely 
necessary.  
 Michael Dumper presents a creative argument to consider Jerusalem a many-bordered 
city.58 Over the past century the borders of Jerusalem have shifted no less than three times. The 
following section shall detail how conflict and conquest, perpetrated by both Palestinian and 
Israeli military apparatuses, have physically divided the city. Furthermore this section shall 
consider how this division has enabled each side to claim dominance over particular geographic 																																																								
58 Michael Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound: Geography, History, and the Future of the Holy City (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
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areas and reinforce dominance at their will. Specifically, this section shall focus more on Jewish-
Israeli military dominance in West Jerusalem, as this is the space that is relevant to the study.  
 The first section of this chapter explains how the borders of Jerusalem evolved due to 
both Palestinian and Israeli military victories during the British Mandate, the 1948 War, and the 
1967 War. Next this section shall shift to focus on present day Israeli dominated West Jerusalem. 
This section considers 1967 as a turning point for Israeli military and security policy. It details 
how the presence of Israeli defense apparatus’s robust security apparatus in Jerusalem, and West 
Jerusalem in particular, reinforces Israeli territorial dominance over the area. Finally this section 
considers the 2014 Gaza War, and the ‘Knifing Intifada’ in Jerusalem (2014 – 2016), as a period 
of time in which Israeli defense apparatuses used military and security measures to enforce 
territorial dominance.  
 This chapter refers to major wars in Israel’s history by the year, instead of by any 
accepted name. One aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the dual narrative associated with 
each respective side.59 For instance what the Palestinian narrative refers to as ‘Al Nakba,’ or the 
Palestinian Exodus, the Jewish-Israeli narrative refers to as ‘The War of Independence’ and is 
often referred to in jubilee. In an effort to remain as politically neutral as possible, this study 
refers to select events as the 1948 War or the 1967 War. For readers who are unfamiliar with the 
exact chronology of the history, please see Appendix E in the index for an event key that 
describes each war in both Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli narrative terms.  
2.0 Theoretical Foundations of Military and Security Dominance in Public Space: 
 One way to measure military and security dominance over a space is to consider the 
coercive effect of that military or security presence on their civilian surroundings. In discussing 																																																								
59 Abdel Monem Said. Aly, Shai Feldman, and Khalil Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and 
Peacemaking in the Middle East (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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the robustness of authoritarian regimes, Bellin (2004) develops the concept of degrees of 
coercion employed by a military, or security apparatus. Bellin notes that the coercive apparatus 
includes all levels of public security (military, police, intelligence agencies, etc.). The coercive 
apparatus theory is comprised of two components: capacity and will. The legitimacy of the 
coercive apparatus is defined and measured according to two components: capacity, and will. 
The capacity of the apparatus is measures in terms of the resources, international support, and 
amount of potential impact, which the apparatus has at their disposal. The will of the coercive 
apparatus refers to the perceived probability that the military or security forces will act in 
violence against a civilian. 60   
 We can measure the Israeli military and security apparatus’ dominance in terms of 
Bellin’s coercive apparatus theory by defining the extent of the Israeli apparatus’ capacity, and 
will. At the start of the British Mandate, Jewish (not yet Israeli) militias had hardly begun to 
develop- the Jewish people had low military and security capacity. The Jewish militia’s low 
capacity means they could not have been dominant in the space. Over the course of the British 
Mandate, Jewish militias gained military capacity. In addition, the increasing number of Jewish 
militia perpetuated violence, in particular bombing the King David Hotel (1946), demonstrated 
their willingness to disrupt civilian life. This demonstrates the Jewish militia’s increasing 
dominance over the physical space in West Jerusalem. During the War of 1948 and War of 1967 
the Israeli army and security apparatus solidified their capacity for violence and demonstrate 
their willingness to shoot. By the end of the War of 1967 the Israeli military and security 
apparatus had claimed dominance over West Jerusalem and the surrounding territory. In 
contemporary times, the Israeli military and security apparatus maintains dominance through 
demonstrating their sustained capacity and will.   																																																								
60 Professor Hajj, Pol2 217, Wellesley College, Fall 2017, Personal lecture notes 
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3.0 Military Dominance in Jerusalem 1917-1967: 
3.1 The British Mandate (1917 - 1947): 
 Prior to the British Mandate (1917-1948) Jewish and Palestinian conflict over the 
territory of Jerusalem manifested itself primarily in small-scale street riots and non-state brawls. 
In fact, relations between the first robust community of Jewish settlers in the city (circa late 19th 
century) and their Arab counterparts were considered to be civil, if not neighborly.61 During the 
latter half of the 19th century and through the beginning of the 20th century Palestinians and Jews 
lives in Jerusalem with a mutual understanding that the city was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. 
The majority of military conflict over the city was fought between the Turks and the allied 
Britain, France and Russia.62  
 Jews began physically fighting for Jerusalem in the beginning of the 20th century. During 
the final years of the Ottoman Empire (1914-1917) many Jews joined allied forces in the fight 
against Ottoman Turks over Palestine. Jewish soldiers were instrumental in the British army’s 
final capture of Jerusalem from the hands of the Turks. In November 1917, after three years of 
battling the allied German and Turkish army towards Jerusalem, the British army cut through 
Nabulus. On November 21 a British army infantry headed by General Edmund Allenby, defeated 
German-Turkish forces on the slopes of Nebi Samwil. This infantry, the first to gain sight of 
Jerusalem, was comprised of many Jewish soldiers. Jewish soldiers served in two specially 
recruited battalions in the British army (the 38th battalion recruited Jews from the United 
Kingdom, while the 39th Battalion recruited from the United States). The Jewish desire for 
Jerusalem was clear, even from within the confines of the British army. The following passage is 
quoted from Ronald Storrs (soon to be Military Governor of Jerusalem) memoirs:  																																																								
61 Mark A. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2009).  
62 Martin Gilbert, Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century (New York: Wiley, 1998), 42	
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“A British General commanding one of the detachments which took Jerusalem told me at 
the time that the most reckless bravery he had ever seen was shown by a young Jewish 
lance-corporal of a London Regiment who, mounting over a ridge into sudden sight of 
Jerusalem, seemed to be transported and transformed, rushed alone against a Turkish 
machine gun, killed the entire crew, and captured the gun.”63  
 
In this quote a British General describes how a young Jewish lance corporal demonstrated the 
will to conquer Jerusalem. This willingness to use military violence for territorial conquer is the 
same will Bellin identifies in her coercive apparatus theory. Therefor by charging against the 
Turkish forces, this Jewish lance corporal begins the process of dominating Jerusalem.  
On December 4,64 1917 Allenby entered the Old City through Jaffa Gate, on foot. Thus Britain 
seized Jerusalem from the hands of the falling Ottoman Empire and the start of the British 
Mandate in Palestine and British rule over Jerusalem.65  
 During the British Mandate (1917-1948) Jewish-Palestinian relations in Jerusalem turned 
from neighborly to violent and the ethnic conflict over Jerusalem was born into military brawl. 
Over the course of the British Mandate neither Jews nor Palestinians had any politically or 
nationally recognized claim to Jerusalem. Indeed Great Britain was the occupying force in the 
whole of Palestine, including the hoy city of Jerusalem. 
 During these years, Zionist Jews arrived from Eastern Europe to join Jewish military 
groups and fight for a State of Israel. With the British Mandate offices headquarter in Jerusalem, 
the new city was a popular destination.66 Outside the walls of the Old City Jewish immigrants 
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were settling new neighborhoods,67 right beside Arab communities.68 In addition Jews made the 
new Jerusalem home to a host of cultural institutions, such as: the Hadassah Medical Center 
located in Ein Kerem, Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus, and the Bezalel Academy of Art 
located just near the Jaffa gate. Each new cultural institution and Jewish neighborhood in 
Jerusalem reinforced the Jewish Zionist ideology that the Jewish people had an ancient (and now 
modern) right to settle in the holy city.69 
 Over the course of British Mandate period, and based on the increasingly strong Zionist 
ideology and Jewish presence in Jerusalem, Jewish militias such as Nili, the Haganah, the 
Palmach, and the Irgun, grew stronger, more desperate for statehood, and less willing to yield to 
Arab natives. At the same time, Palestinians, native to Jerusalem and shocked by the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire fought to stay on the land of their fathers.70  
 The 1946 bombing at the King David Hotel can be understood as a turning point in non-
state Jewish military organizations fight for Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem in particular.71 On 
July 22 1946 the Jewish military organization, the Irgun, put explosives in the basement of the 
King David Hotel. The King David hotel is situated just outside the Old City. The hotel is also in 
very close proximity to the center of town in West Jerusalem.  
 Members of the Irgun, dressed as Arabs, brought explosives, disguised as milk cartons, to 
the café in the basement of the King David Hotel. Prior to detonating the explosives, the Irgun 
relayed a message to the switchboard operator at the hotel to evacuate the premises. The warning 
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was ignored. The incident caused severe civilian casualties is reaffirmed the Jewish militia’s 
capacity to insight violence.  
3.2 Establishing Israeli Dominance (1947 – 1967): 
 By the end of the 1948 War the Israeli army and security apparatus willfully dominated 
parts of Jerusalem. During the 1948 Battle of Jerusalem Jewish and Arab militias (subsequently 
Israeli and Jordanian military forces) fought for control over Jerusalem. Fighting broke out on 
November 29, 1947 immediately following the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopting 
Resolution 181 (II). The fighting consisted of bombings and military operation attacks on both 
sides, throughout the Old City and surrounding neighborhoods. 
 The Israeli army demonstrated their capacity and will within minutes of British forces 
departing Jerusalem. On May 14 1948 High Commissioner General Sir Alan Cunningham 
resigned his post as High Commissioner of Palestine under the British Mandate, and left for 
England. As Cunningham’s plane took off the Union Jack flag was lowered from the 
Government House in Jerusalem. Within ten minutes of this symbolic gesture soldiers from the 
Hagannah72 advanced to conquer the new city of Jerusalem. The newly recognized Israeli militia 
advanced through Jaffa road, the main road in the new city, and entered the now evacuated 
British security zones. By nightfall the Israeli military organizations had control over the 
developed areas in the new city.73  
 In the early days of the war the Israeli military demonstrated dominant capacity. The 
Israeli army dominated developed areas in the new city through violent means. The conquest of 
the new city demonstrates the Israeli army’s capacity to dominate by violent means. The Israeli 
army’s willingness to conquer through violent means demonstrates their will.  																																																								
72 The Haganah was a Jewish militia group, active during the founding of the State of Israel.   
73 Martin Gilbert, Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century (New York: Wiley, 1998), 211 
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 Over the course of the war this capacity began to wane. By the end of May 1948, the 
Israeli army began losing its hold on the Jewish quarter in the Old City.74  
 The rise of Palestinian nationalism between 1940 and 1967 brought with it new 
Palestinian military organizations.75 Fighting in Jerusalem increased as both Jewish-Israelis and 
Palestinians developed gained access to stronger military companies.  
 The Israeli military’s will to dominate was evident from its founding, as demonstrated in 
the War of 1948. In the War of 1967 the Israeli military and security organizations prove their 
capacity to dominate.  
3.22 Policy Shift- From Conquest to Security 
 During the British Mandate in Palestine, and through Israel’s victory in the early years 
after the 1948 War, Jewish and subsequently Israeli military policy was founded, and self-
justified, on the belief that the Jewish people had a religious right to the holy city of Jerusalem.76 
Leading up to the 1967 War, and especially after Israel’s victory, Israeli military policy vis-à-vis 
Jerusalem shifted, from one of religious or national desire, to one of maintaining security.77 As 
Israeli officials began to consider Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty, their goals began to 
shift from acquiring territory to maintaining security within territory. The following quote from 
the first commander of the Border Police, Pinhas Kopel, captures the Israeli defense apparatus’s 
security sentiment: 
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“We saw two main tasks before us: The first – to establish the units, train the men, and instill in 
them the importance of their role The second – to provide the citizens, who had just arrived in the 
country with a sense of security…”78   
 
 Understanding Israel’s shift towards a security maintenance policy helps to contextualize 
much of the Israeli defense organizations behavior in and around Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem 
in particular, over the past 50 years. Specifically, during times of increased conflict (both from 
Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli non-state actors) the Israeli military and security forces increase 
their presence in public space. This is done in order to retain dominance over territory through 
security, not in order to conquer additional territory. This study shall consider the Israeli military 
and security actions during Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada with the context 
of this security policy.  
4.0 Israeli Military and Security Dominance in Jerusalem- Case Studies: 
 Applying theories of military and security dominance to the case of Jerusalem, we can 
infer that increased military and security presence has arguably contributed to the publics’ 
perception of Israeli security and military dominance over public space in Jerusalem. The 
following section shall summarize times of intense conflict in Jerusalem. Specifically this section 
shall describe the violence associated with the following two events: 1) Operation Protective 
Edge (summer 2014), and 2) the Knifing Intifada (2014-2016). In each case this section shall 
detail how Israeli security apparatuses responded to the violence by increasing security 
measures, mainly physical presence in public space. Lastly, we shall detail for each case how the 
increase in Israeli security presence in Jerusalem reinforced Israeli dominance both in the minds 
of the Palestinians, but also in the minds of the Israeli public.   
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4.1 Operation Protective Edge:  
4.12 Violence:  
 On June 12, 2014 Naftali Frenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah, three Israel teenage 
boys, were kidnapped from a hitchhiking stop just outside of Jerusalem.79 Within one day of the 
kidnapping the details of the capture went viral over social media within the Israeli community. 
Within days Israeli security agencies determined the boys’ kidnappers were members of Hamas 
who were residing in the West Bank, just outside of Jerusalem. On June 30, 2014 authorities 
located the bodies of the deceased boys, buried in recently acquired Palestinian owned land, 
located out of Jerusalem, just north of the city of Hebron.80 On July 2, 2014 Israeli settlers 
kidnapped Mohammed Abu Khdeir, a 16-year-old Palestinian boy from the streets of East 
Jerusalem. Israeli authorities found Khdeir’s remains hours later in the Jerusalem Forest.81 
 These two incidents escalated into mass violent demonstrations from both Israelis and 
Palestinians, ultimately culminating in a summer long Operation Protective Edge, also known as 
the 2014 Gaza War. The primary actors in the military operation were Israeli Defense Forces and 
Hamas. Based solely on information available to the public, it is believed that during this time 
Hamas was primarily operating from within the Gaza strip, with satellite contacts in areas in the 
West Bank. Given that Hamas’ primary organization was based in Gaza, the majority of friction 
took place on the Gaza boarder and within Gaza between Israeli Defense Forces, Hamas 
combatants and residents of Gaza.  
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 Though the majority of violence took place in Gaza, Jerusalem did also see significant 
friction between the Jewish-Israel and Palestinian civilian populations. The series of civilian 
violence and Israeli military and security apparatus actions, included in the following section, is 
based on Live (online) Updates published by Ha’aretz newspaper.82 The updates were published 
from the third day of Operation Protective Edge (July 10, 2014) through the fiftieth, and last 
official day of the operation (August 27, 2014).83 The majority of violence erupted in areas 
specific areas of East Jerusalem (most notably Issawiya and Shoafat neighborhoods) and around 
the Old City.84  
5.13 Increase in Israeli Security and Dominance In Public Space 
  The following paragraphs shall detail Israel’s increased security and military measures in 
and around Jerusalem during Operation Protective Edge. This section shall present a 
chronological summary of specific security and military operations conducted during this time. 
Here we demonstrate the Israeli military and security apparatus’s dominance in Jerusalem by 
demonstrating the capacity for, and willingness to, sustain violence.  
 In response to the kidnapping of the three boys the IDF initiated Operation Brother’s 
Keeper.85 The operation consisted of an 11-day search, in and around Judea Samaria, for the 
boys. During this time the IDF arrested almost 300 Palestinians, including almost all of the 
Hamas’ leaders working out of the West Bank.86 These arrests clearly demonstrate the IDF’s 
capacity for effecting violence in this territory.  
																																																								
82 Ha’aretz is a well-known news source amongst Jewish Israelis. Ha’aretz publishes  
83 See Appendix B for a detailed description and presentation of data collection and analysis. 
84 See Table B.1: Haaretz Live Updates Operation Protective Edge, July 10 - August 27, 2014, Jerusalem 
Related 
85 "Operation Bring Back Our Brothers: IDF Arrest 200, Shift Focus to Nablus," Ynetnews, , accessed 
April 24, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4531266,00.html.  
86 William Booth and Ruth Eglash, "Israelis Worry about Missing Jewish Teens, but Military Wants to 
Hit Hamas, Too," The Washington Post, June 18, 2014, , accessed April 24, 2018,  
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 As mentioned previously, the Israeli military’s primary objective during Operation 
Protective Edge was to combat the Hamas organization. Therefor the majority of Israeli military 
forces during the operation were deployed, in offensive measures, on the boarder of the Gaza 
strip, or sent in to Gaza for strategic combat.87 The Israeli military presence in and around 
Jerusalem may have been employed in order to combat the small contingent of Hamas’ leaders in 
the West Bank. However, given the event immediately preceding Operation Protective Edge, that 
of Operation Brothers Keeper, it is likely that the Israeli military had a strong hand over Hamas’ 
presence in the West Bank, and therefor chose to focus their attention on Hamas in the Gaza 
strip. 
 With this in mind it is important to distinguish between Israeli military presence for 
offensive purposes against Hamas, and military presence for defensive purposes of containing a 
perceived threat. On the third day of the operation, July 11, 2014, Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu said, “There cannot be a situation under any agreement, in which we relinquish 
security control of the territory west of the Jordan River.”88 A large portion of Israel’s military 
presence and all of its security presence in and around Jerusalem during this time was in order to 
maintain strategic security. This strategic security is both to ensure the immediate safety of 
citizens of the State of Israel, as well as in order to secure a military vantage; it is not to conduct 
offensive warfare.  
 In the first days of the operation, and controlling for the increased IDF presence from 
Operation Brothers Keeper, there is little evidence of a significant increase in police patrol in 
Jerusalem. The primary role of the security apparatuses in the beginning of the operation 
included responding to riots in East Jerusalem, and arresting rioters who were disturbing the 																																																								
87 Steven Erlanger and Isabel Kershner, "Israel and Hamas Trade Attacks as Tension Rises," The New 
York Times, July 08, 2014, , accessed April 24, 2018, 	
88 Netanyahu, quoted from Ha’aretz 7.11.14 
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peace. It is reasonable to assume that there was some increase in deployment of security bodies 
on the streets of West Jerusalem in the early days of the operation, though no such record is 
available to the public.  
 On the eleventh day of the operation, July 18, 2014, the Home Front Command 
announced a prohibition of over 1,000 people in open areas 40-80 kilometers from the Gaza 
Strip. This perimeter includes areas such as Tel Aviv as well as Jerusalem. The purpose of this 
regulation is hard to determine. Given the radius is relative to a perimeter surrounding the Gaza 
Strip, it is likely the regulation was set in place in order to avoid mass casualty due to rocket fire 
(rocket fire coming out of the Gaza strip).   
 The Home Front Command regulation was the first large scale Israeli security action that 
influenced public space the. This type of action results in Israeli security dominance over public 
space in that it regulates civilian behavior within the space. This form of security regulation, 
similar to a curfew, is a psychological constraint on the civilian. The civilian knows they must 
abide by this rule, in so far as they abide, they are yielding to, and by extension affirming, the 
dominance of the security apparatus. 
 The following days saw increased violence around Jerusalem, particularly between 
Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem and Israeli police forces. For instance, on day 15, July 23, 
2014, rioters in East Jerusalem erupted, throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. Israeli police 
forces responded with riot-control measures, and no injuries were reported. By day 17, July 25, 
2014, civilian violence in East Jerusalem had significantly escalated with tens of thousands of 
Palestinians marching from Ramallah to Jerusalem. In response Israeli security forces deployed 
thousands of police officers and border police around the capital. In addition, Israeli security 
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forces put in place a ban for Palestinians under the age of 50 to enter Al-Aqsa Mosque in 
Jerusalem, through the end of Friday prayers.   
 By day 25, August 1, 2014, reports show that “heavy police presence is being felt in 
Jerusalem.” The increasing security presence was likely due to the end of the Ramadan holiday 
and the anticipation that riots would potentially increase in momentum. Israeli security forces 
reinforced their presence along Jerusalem’s seam zones and took strategic position at 
checkpoints and friction zones on the outskirts to West Jerusalem and within East Jerusalem. 
Information regarding the exact location of these strategic vantage points is not publicly 
available.  
 The primary source of Israeli security apparatus’ physical dominance over the city of 
Jerusalem became clear on day 17, July 25, 2014, when thousands of officers and patrol were 
deployed around the city, thus demonstrating their strong capacity for physical control over the 
space. This mass deployment began a period of time when middle to heavy police presence was 
felt in both East and West Jerusalem. Police presence was particularly obvious in friction areas 
such as at the gates to the Old City, and on the seams, between Jewish and Palestinian 
neighborhoods. 
 Israeli security presence in and around Jerusalem remained at this level through the 
remainder of Operation Protective Edge. It is hard to determine when exactly security presence 
in Jerusalem returned to post operation levels. This is due primarily to the post summer 2014 
violence that erupted in Jerusalem, outside the scope of the military Operation Protective Edge. 
On August 27 the official IDF military operation ended and the IDF withdrew from the Gaza, 
and areas in the West Bank. Thought he military operation was over, violence in Jerusalem 
continued. The months after Operation Protective Edge transitioned into what is retroactively 
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known as ‘The Knifing Intifada.’ A detailed analysis of the Israeli security apparatus in West 
Jerusalem during The Knifing Intifada shall be presented in following sections.  
5.2 Knifing Intifada: 
5.21 Violence: 
 Though the Israeli military Operation Protective Edge ended on August 27, violence in 
and around Jerusalem continued through 2015. The violence that later became known as the 
‘Knifing Intifada’ or the ‘Silent Intifada’ was born out of the events in summer 2014. 
Immediately following the end of the military operation a series of knifings in and around West 
Jerusalem, in particular the Old City started to occur. Similar to the section above describing 
violence in Operation Protective Edge in and around Jerusalem, the following section shall detail 
the violence of the Knifing Intifada. 
5.22 Increase in Israeli Security and Dominance in Public Space: 
 In contrast to Protective Edge, the Knifing Intifada was unique to Jerusalem. This means 
that all security and military escalation was related to the events within the city. In addition, the 
Knifing Intifada is not recognized by the IDF as a military operation. Intelligence communities 
and various units in the IDF may collaborate with Jerusalem security forces to ensure safety in 
West Jerusalem. But all security policy and presence during this period belongs to Jerusalem’s 
security forces, not Israel’s military forces.  
 There were likely many points during 2014-2015 during which the Israeli security 
community increased security presence in Jerusalem due to the Knifing Intifada. Two major 
security increases stand out: one in October 2014, and another in October 2015. The first was on 
October 21, 2014, in response to the increasing casualties in and around the Old City, Israeli 
security forces announced they would be taking extra measures and increasing security. The 
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comprehensive details of the increase in security are not available to the public at the time this 
study was conducted.89  
 The following passage, written in October of 2015, depicts one author’s account of his 
feelings walking on the military guarded streets of Jerusalem: 
“The streets of West Jerusalem are eerie and still. Silence hangs over the city… busses 
are half empty… heavily armed security forces, joined by army reinforcements, patrol 
checkpoints, bus stops and deserted sidewalks. Young men in plain clothes carry assault 
rifles… In the city’s… East [Jerusalem], residents are frightened, too. Massive cement 
cubes block exits from their neighborhoods. Lengthy lines at new checkpoints keep many 
from their jobs. Men under 40 who were barred from Al Aqsa Mosque on Friday prayed 
instead behind police barricades in the surrounding decrepit streets.”90  
 
Thrall’s depiction links the eerie and empty feeling felt in the streets of Jerusalem to the increase 
in military and security presence. The presence of military and security personnel is ultimately 
for the benefit of the residents of Jerusalem. And this study is not arguing that the Israeli military 
and security intends to create an eerie and still feeling in the streets of Jerusalem. This anecdote 
simply correlates this eeriness with the presence of military and security.   
 The second significant increase in security presence took place on October 14, 2015. 
These security measures included erecting roadblocks and checkpoints in and around East 
Jerusalem, including near the seams of West Jerusalem. The authorities also deployed hundreds 
of police officers and military personnel to monitor streets and public transportation in both East 
and West Jerusalem.91   
6.0 Habermas as Counterargument:   
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 Habermas would likely disagree with the notion that a public space can be dominated by 
any specific culture- particularly when that culture is of national or political origin. According to 
Habermas’ definition, public space is in fact that place without governance.92  Indeed it is a valid 
argument that given the physical, political, and cultural tensions and perceived dominant status 
of Israel, Jerusalem, and particularly West Jerusalem, cannot be considered a public space. One 
way to reconcile this dilemma is to define public space, within the context of Israeli dominated 
West Jerusalem. In the context of West Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, Habermans’s 
concept of publicly accessible space applies only to Jewish Israelis.  
  
																																																								
92 See ‘Chapter 1, section 2.11: The Public Sphere,’ for further discussion 
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Chapter Three 
Jerusalem’s Secular Creative Class Cultural Lull 
“The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but their inward 
significance.93” – Aristotle 
 
1.0 Introduction: 
 The previous chapter detailed the increase in violence and Israeli military and security 
presence in Jerusalem during Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada. As mentioned 
in that chapter, as violence and military and security presence increased, the “… streets of 
Jerusalem became eerie and still.94” One subset of the population, the secular creative class, lost 
creative inertia during this time. Let us consider the decrease in street art production, and change 
in levels of museum attendance. This series of evidence demonstrates the Jerusalem’s secular 
creative class’s cultural lull during the violence of Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing 
Intifada.  
 With this cultural lull in mind we turn to testing the hypothesis that artists in Jerusalem’s 
creative class were coerced, based on fear, by the Israeli military and security apparatus, out of 
producing creative culture during times of conflict. I present a fear-based model as my 
conjecture to explain the relationship between the Israeli security and military apparatus and 
artists in Jerusalem’s secular creative class.  
 Contrary to theoretical foundations,95 evidence gathered in this study argues against 
accepting this fear-based model. Anecdotal evidence collected from five interviews with street 
artists suggest something other than fear was at play during this time. Alternative explanations 
																																																								
93 Attributed to Aristotle  
94 Nathan Thrall, "Mismanaging the Conflict in Jerusalem," The New York Times, October 18, 2015, , 
accessed April 24, 2018,  
95 See theoretical framework in Chapter One: Introduction.  
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for the cultural lull include: limited resources available to the artists, as well as imposed time 
constraints due to military obligations.    
2.0 Defining the Secular Creative Class: 
 This study shall focus on individuals at the intersection of Jerusalem’s creative class and 
the secular population. The reason this study shall not focus on the Palestinian creative class is 
simply because of the divide between East and West Jerusalem. Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli 
populations in Jerusalem operate in separate economic, commercial, and cultural spheres. 96 
Therefor we shall distinguish now between the Palestinian creative class and the Jewish-Israeli 
creative class in West Jerusalem. This study shall focus on the Jewish-Israeli creative class, as 
this is the creative class associated with the dominant Israeli society. In this study we seek to 
understand why a creative class associated with a dominant society might go silent in times of 
conflict.  
2.1 Jewish population in West Jerusalem 
 The Jewish population, in Israel at large, and particularly in Jerusalem, is comprised of 
factions based on various degrees of religious affiliations. We can divide the Israeli Jewish 
population into five subgroups (based on religious affiliation): ultra-orthodox, religious-
nationalist, traditional-religious, traditional, and secular.  
 These religious affiliations are significant in that they dictate the foundation for much of 
the social, economic, political, and cultural realities on municipal and even national level. As is 
the case in many religious and sectarian societies, religious-social affiliations in Israel can be 
observed from individual practices, as well as collective allegiance and institutional behavior. In 
terms of everyday individual practice, religious affiliation can be observed from something as 																																																								
96 Michael Romann, et al. "Employment Relations: The Integration of a Divided Labor Market." In Living 
Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem, 99-125. Princeton University Press, 
1991.  
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basic as fashion. On average, individuals with strong secular affiliations dawn more modern 
garb, while the stronger the religious affiliation, the more modest the individual’s dress. 
Religious affiliations are also relevant in the political sphere; again both on a national and 
municipal level. 
 Table 1, pictured below, provides a statistical description of the Jewish Population in 
West Jerusalem by religious affiliation: 
Table 1: Jewish Population in Jerusalem by Religious 
Identification, Comparison Over Time: 
  2002-2009 2010-2016 
Ultra-Orthodox 28% 33% 
Religious Nationalist 18% 20% 
Traditional-Religious  12% 12% 
Traditional 20% 15% 
Secular 22% 20% 
(Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics) 
 
 As shown in Table 1, the ultra-orthodox population, the largest of the five religious 
groups, has grown over the past twenty years and now comprises 33% of the Jewish population 
in Jerusalem. The religious-nationalist population has also grown over the past two decades and 
now makes up 20% of the population. In contrast the less religious groups (traditional religious, 
traditional, and secular) has either not changed relative to the population as a whole (i.e. 
traditional religious), or has decreased in relative terms.  
 It is interesting to note that the ‘traditional’ and ‘secular’ groups averaged 20% and 22% 
of the Jewish population in Jerusalem, respectably, between 2002 and 2009. However between 
2010 and 2016 ‘traditional’ affiliations decreased to 15% of the Jewish population in Jerusalem, 




2.131 Ultra-Orthodox Population: 
 Similar to the Palestinian population, the ultra-orthodox (and the bulk of the religious-
nationalist) populations shall be considered beyond the scope of this study. Within West 
Jerusalem there are two main city centers. One is the commercial center maintained by the ultra-
orthodox populations; the other is the city center that services the secular and religious-
nationalist populations. These two populations function in very different ways and tend to only 
meet on the political playground, when policy is at stake. One central characteristics that defines 
the ultra-orthodox populations is that they are ‘closed societies.’ Modern secular (sometimes 
referred to simply as ‘western’) society operates on principles such as open information 
ecologies, transparency, and individualism and associated individual rights.  
2.132 Secular/ Traditional Population: 
 This study shall consider the creative behavior born out of the secular creative class.   
3.0 Cultural Lull: 
3.1 Production of Street Art in Jerusalem Overtime:  
 One measure of public art and creative culture in Jerusalem is the level of street 
art/graffiti adorning the city walls. The bright colors of the murals, or the catchy slogans 
splashed across shop walls, are character traits associated with vibrant urban culture. According 
to one Jerusalem street artist graffiti is “the art of the revolutionary,” it is the sign of change in 
urban space, or the authentic interaction between artist and crowd.97 According to a city planning 
official, graffiti “is dirty enough to be real, and cool enough to attract the masses. To the 
common residents, graffiti is a sign that ‘here lies culture, this is a cool place.98” A third artist 
says, “I use graffiti to turn a space into a place. I want my art to invite people to this wall, or this 																																																								
97 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)  
98 Ron, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)   
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corner, to develop, in this place I have created.99” These anecdotes demonstrate how street artists 
view their graffiti as contributing to the cultural vibrancy of a place. The anecdote from the city-
planning official demonstrates that even Jerusalem’s governing authority considers graffiti as an 
integral aspect of the cities cultural composition. Based on these understandings, this study shall 
use production of street art to measure the cultural vibrancy of Jerusalem, across time.  
 Figure Two: Street Art Production In Jerusalem (2012-2017), pictured below, compares 
amount of street art produced in different time intervals, to levels of military and security 
presence in Jerusalem, during those same time intervals. This graph is based on a collection of 
261 units of graffiti photographed from the streets of West Jerusalem. Each unit of graffiti refers 
to one graffiti sketch. In some cases graffiti may be overlapping. In this study we differentiate 
between the two elements, each sketch of graffiti, though they overlap, is measured as an 
individual unit.  
 The time period of creation cannot be determined for 35 of the 261 units of graffiti 
measured. Of the 261 units, 42 units were created before 2012. The sample measured 20 units of 
graffiti created in 2011, 17 units from 2010, 7 units from 2009, 2 units from 2008, and 2 units 
from 2007. In addition, there were several units from the years 2002, 2005, and 2006. These 
units, though identified during the analysis phase, are undocumented in the sample as the exact 
time-period of creation are questionable. These units, that pre-date 2012, are not represented in 
Figure Two, below. It is likely that overtime graffiti fades or is covered up, either by new art, or 
by law enforcement or municipality intervention. Unfortunately there is no baseline for average 
graffiti production per year. Therefor we shall consider graffiti production in a comparative 
perspective. We can determine the productivity of street artists during times of conflict by 
comparing amount of graffiti created in the years just prior, and post, the periods of conflict. The 																																																								
99 Barel, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017) 
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orange vertical shading in the graph highlights the time periods during which military and 
security presence increased in Jerusalem. 
 
 As shown in Figure 1, the sample contained 42 units of graffiti created in 2012. Graffiti 
units created, observed in the sample, rose by 16.67 percent, to 49 units, in 2013. In 2014 
observed graffiti production decreased by 69.39 percent, to 15 observed units. In 2015 observed 
graffiti production increased by 66.6 percent, to 25 units.  
 There are two possible explanations for the rise in graffiti creation, observed between 
2012 and 2013. One possibility is that more street art from 2013 is available for observation from 
2013, compared to 2012, given that 2013 is more recent. The second explanation is the 2013 
Israeli Parliament, as well as the Jerusalem municipality elections, both held in 2013, inspired 
additional political graffiti in support or against candidates. Indeed graffiti dated to 2013 
included many references to Jerusalem’s mayor, Nir Barkat, as well as various national party 
candidates, primarily the head of the Likud party, Bibi Netanyahu, as well as the head of the 



















 For instance one stencil piece (Image Seven), though somewhat faded, still clearly says 
תקרב (pronounced ‘Barkat,’ is the last name of Jerusalem’s mayor, Nir Barkat). The text 
underneath the name is already illegible due to the age of the piece. Though illegible, it is clear 
that the middle line of text is crossed out. This crossing out of the text was most likely done by a 
second party, in response to the content embedded in the initial graffiti unit. This stencil is one 
example of graffiti practiced in connection with the municipal election in 2013. In this case the 
graffiti also prompted a response, additional street art productivity.  
 In 2014 the amount of street art produced seems to have significantly declined. This 
finding does not prove a causal relationship between the violence and security in Jerusalem 
during 2014, and the decline in street art production. This finding simply demonstrates the 
cultural lull, in at least street art production, during the period under question. Of the 15 units of 
graffiti observed from 2015, some are clearly related to the violence in the city, while a majority 
is without connection to the political climate. It is possible 2014 was an anomaly year in terms of 
street art production. If this were the case we would expect to see graffiti production in 
subsequent years increase to levels matching 2012 and 2013 (i.e. in the 40-50 observed units, 
range). This is not the case; indeed graffiti production levels remain in the teens to mid-twenties 
levels throughout 2016. These observations work to support the hypothesis that the cultural lull 
in Jerusalem, observed through graffiti production, is correlated with times of high military and 
security presence.  
 The rise in observed graffiti production in 2015, relative to that of 2014, can be explained 
by the 2015 Israeli Parliamentary elections. For example, one stencil, The Caesar to Caesarea 
(Image Eight) garnered particular popularity100 during the 2015 Israeli parliamentary season. 																																																								
100 Zeevveez, "יטיפרג רסיקה הירסיקל," Flickr, March 24, 2015, accessed April 24, 2018, 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/zeevveez/16913045901.  
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Pictured in the center of the stencil is a caricature of Benjamin Netanyahu. The figures gaze is 
smug and seems to look down upon the viewer. Above the figure, in block letters, is the work 
הרסיק (pronounced ‘kei-sar,’ translated to mean ‘The Caesar’). Below the figurehead, written in 
the same block letter font, is written הירסיקל (pronounced ‘La-Kei-Saria,’ translated to mean ‘to 
Caesarea’). The stencils were sprayed on surfaces around the Prime Minister’s residence in 
Jerusalem.  
 Indeed the amount of produced graffiti observed in 2015 increased relative to levels 
observed in 2014. Still, the levels of productions are low compared to the years prior to 
Operation Protective Edge. One would expect levels of graffiti in 2015 to match levels of graffiti 
in 2013, especially considering both were election years. One might argue the comparison 
between graffiti produced in 2015 to that of 2013 is asymmetric considering both municipal and 
parliamentary elections took place in 2013, while only parliamentary elections took place in 
2015. Let us therefor compare levels of graffiti produced in 2015, to levels of graffiti production 
in 2012. Neither a municipal nor a parliamentary election took place in Jerusalem in 2012. 
Therefor we would expect the sample to include less graffiti produced in 2012, relative to 2015. 
Especially considering 2012 was five years prior the time of collection, whereas 2015 was only 
two years prior. It is therefor surprising that there were only 25 street samples observed from 
2015, whereas there were 42 samples from 2012. This evidence supports the claim that street art 
production decreased on a global urban scale in Jerusalem during 2015, in addition to 2014.  
 Observed graffiti production moderately declined in 2016, relative to 2015. Compared to 
production levels in 2014, graffiti production levels in 2016 arguably increased, slightly. In terms 
of municipal and national electoral politics, 2016 was an insignificant year. This likely explains 
part of the decline in street art production levels observed between 2015 and 2016. Comparing to 
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2014, more graffiti was produced in 2016. This trend is in keeping with the theory that cultural 
vibrancy as measured through graffiti production is correlated with military and security 
presence. In Chapter Two we discussed the military and security presence in Jerusalem in 2016 
as part of the Knifing Intifada. Recall that security presence significantly increased in 2014 and 
2015, but not in 2016. Though there was much violence in the city during 2016, the Jerusalem 
police did not issue any new policy pertaining to citizen behavior. In other words, the intensity 
with which the presence of the security apparatus was felt in West Jerusalem was arguably lower 
relative to prior years. This might explain the upward trend in street art production, relative to 
2014.  
 This study recognizes that a decline in publicly displayed street art observed during times 
of conflict in the city, is not an empirical basis for a causal relationship between increased 
violence and decreased graffiti production. Indeed, there are many reasons public street art may 
fluctuate, aside from increase in military and security violence associated with political conflict. 
One common reason artists stop producing street art, is executive intervention on behalf of law 
enforcement agencies. Cities across the globe balance the fine line between culturally stimulating 
street art, and vandalism. Jerusalem is no exception to this urban struggle. All artists consulted in 
this study recognized the risk embedded in their work. In particular, each of the five streets 
artists formally interviewed for this study, as well as the dozens of side conversations with 
Jerusalem’s graffiti community commented on the illegal nature of their activity. Shira, one 
street artist, previously based in Jerusalem but now works primarily in Tel Aviv, noted how, after 
her first arrest for vandalism, she abandoned street art. Shira noted how only years later did she 
return to the art.101 
																																																								
101 Shira, Telephone informal interview, (March 2018)	
	 51	
 It is important to note that the risk for arrest on the grounds of vandalism are likely 
significantly higher during times when extra police officers are deployed around the city, for 
instance during times of conflict such as between 2014 to 2016. For this reason it is important to 
distinguish between fear of arrest on the grounds of vandalism, and silence due to coercion. In 
the case of vandalism the offense is in the very act of graffiti on public property, or private 
property without the permission of the owner. In the case of fear-based coercion the offense is in 
the content of the graffiti, not the act of graffiti. In testing the fear-based coercion model we are 
testing to see if street artists limit street art production during time of conflict out of content-
censorship.  
 Another form of intervention is whitewashing. The Jerusalem Municipality, and in some 
cases private property owners will deliberately paint over graffiti that is deemed either offensive, 
politically incorrect, or disruptive in any manner. Ironically, when a wall is whitewashed, it tends 
to further invite street artists to paint. In the words of one street artist, “the white washing 
literally provides me with a white canvas.102” Still, whitewashing will account for erasing graffiti 
produced on the streets of Jerusalem. It is possible that more graffiti was produced in 2014 that 
was deemed deliberately offensive given the potential nature of the work.   
 In addition to intervention on behalf of law enforcement agencies, we have noted how 
graffiti production may fluctuate, primarily due to political happenings, such as elections. As 
noted in the analysis above, in comparison to the previous year, election years tend to yield more 
graffiti production. These factors are important to consider in analyzing this data.  
 Still, the data presented in Figure Two do show a cultural lull in so far as the trend for 
graffiti production in Jerusalem declined during 2014 to 2016. Only in 2017 do we observe 
graffiti production levels that begin to match those in years prior to 2014.  On the basis of this 																																																								
102 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017) 
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evidence this study shall claim that, in so far as graffiti production measures the cultural vibrancy 
of Jerusalem’s secular creative class, between 2014 and 2016 there was a cultural lull in 
Jerusalem.  
3.2 Museum Visitation Levels in Jerusalem Overtime:  
 A second measure of Jerusalem’s cultural appetite is levels of museum visitation over 
time. This measure differs from the previous data on street art production as it measures the 
public’s appetite for cultural consumption, not the artists desire, or ability to produce. As we 
move to consider museum visitation levels, I ask the reader shift their perspective from a locus of 
cultural production to a locus cultural consumption. This study began with a focus on street art, 
but has since expanded to consider cultural vibrancy in the city of Jerusalem. Both production 
and consumption are relevant in measuring cultural vibrancy.  
 Table 2: Museum Visitation Levels In Jerusalem (2009-2016), pictured on the following 
page, is one measure of the cultural appetite for consumption in Jerusalem, between 2009 and 
2016. The table presents visitation level data for nine prominent museums in Jerusalem: the 
Israel Museum, Tower of David, Yad Vashem National Holocaust Museum, Old Yishuv Court, 
Museum of Natural History Museum for Islamic Art, Bloomfield Science Museum, Bible Lands 
Museum, and the Museum of Underground Prisoners. The data presented in the first five 
columns of the table are raw visitor numbers per year. Starting with the year 2013 the table adds 
‘percent change’ columns every year showing the percent change between the year in question 
and one year prior. For example, the first instance is this is column six showing the percent 
change in visitor levels between 2012 and 2013.  
 Museum visitation levels were mixed in 2013 compared to 2012. The Israel Museum saw 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a substantial 21.30 percent decrease in visitation levels. The remaining seven museums in the 
table saw mild fluctuations in visitation levels between 2012 and 2013.  
 In 2014 museum visitation levels plummeted. The Israel Museum, one of Israel’s most 
highly regarded museums of fine art, saw a 27.45 percent decline in visitors, relative to 2013. To 
put this into context, in 2013 visitation levels to the Israel Museum rose 14.36 percent, relative to 
2012. Since 2009 the Israel Museum did not see a decline in visitation levels until 2014. The 
Tower of David Museum, located in the Old City of Jerusalem, saw an 8.68 percent decline 
during this time period. The Museum of Underground Prisoners located deep in the Old City of 
Jerusalem saw a 15.30 percent decline in visitation levels. By far the most substantial decline 
was the Museum of Natural History that saw a 126.08 percent decline in museum visitation 
levels in 2014 compared to 2013. Visitation levels to the Museum of Natural History increased 
compared to the year prior in both 2013 and 2015 (data is not available for 2016). The museum 
only saw declining visitation levels in 2014. Only two museums saw an increase in visitation 
levels in 2014- the Bloomfield Science Museum, and the Bible Lands Museum. However for 
both of these museums, visitation levels increased at modest rates, the former at 2.08 percent and 
the latter at 7.61 percent. Museum visitation levels, on average, were better in 2015, compared 
with 2014.  
 Six of the nine museums listed saw increasing museum visitation levels in 2015, relative 
to 2014. Still, Jerusalem’s three most well attended museums: The Israel Museum, the Tower of 
David Museum, and Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial Museum all experienced decreasing 
visitation levels during this time. These trends in museum visitation levels as presented in Table 
2, on the previous page, support the claim that the cultural appetite in Jerusalem decreased from 
2014 to 2016.  
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4.0 Coopting Public Space through a Fear-Based Model: 
 After recognizing this cultural lull we must consider the relationship between increased 
military and security presence in public space during times of conflict and decreasing cultural 
vibrancy. My initial conjecture considered the following, fear-based model that might explain the 
relationship between increasing military and security presence and cultural lull.  
Figure 2: Israeli Security/Military Apparatus and Jerusalem Creative Class, Fear-Based Model: 
 
 
 Figure 2: Israeli Security/Military Apparatus and Jerusalem Creative Class, Fear-Based 
Model, summarizes my initial conjecture explaining one potential relationship between the 
military and security apparatus and the secular creative class in Jerusalem. This fear-based model 
	 56	
draws on Eva Bellin’s theory of the military as a coercive apparatus103 in order to define fear-
based coercion.104  
 The model depicts three main bodies: the Israeli military and security apparatus 
(condensed to ‘Security Apparatus’ in the figure, in the interest of visual accessibility), the 
creative class (in this figure, and henceforth the term ‘creative class’ refers to the secular creative 
class in Jerusalem), and the public art produced by the creative class. The straight arrows, 
pointing from the Security Apparatus towards the Creative Class, represent the relationship 
between the apparatus and the creative class, as perceived by the Creative Class. The wavy 
arrows originating with the Creative Class and pointing towards the Public Art variable, 
represents the fluctuation in public street art production.  
 Under this model I hypothesize this relationship is one on cooptation that leads to fear-
based coercion. I posit that from the perspective of the street artist, the increase in Israeli military 
and security dominance in the physical public space is seen as a cooptation of that space. In 
coopting the space the military and security apparatus demand the public respect their presence. I 
expect the Israeli military and security bodies enforce this respect through fear-based coercion. 
The increase in military and security dominance insights fear in the public and coerces public 
artists out of producing street art. In turn, the street artist limits graffiti production as a means to 
censor their public expression. 
 In order to understand the significance of cooptation it is important to recognize the 
special relationship between artists and public space. In Chapter One and at the end of Chapter 
Two we considered the theoretical foundations of public space. One of the central tenants of 
public space is that it is accessible to all members of a society. In Chapter Two we limited our 																																																								
103 Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): doi:10.2307/4150140. 
104 See Chapter One: Introduction 
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definition of public space in West Jerusalem to Jewish Israeli public space. We concluded that 
public space in West Jerusalem, post 1967, is accessible to all Jewish-Israelis and is therefor 
considered to be a, Jewish Israeli, public domain. This model considers how an increase in 
military and security dominance in public space may interact with street artists accessibility 
(both physically, as well as psychologically) to enter, and transform that space. In coopting the 
space the military and security apparatus limit the Creative Class’ accessibility, and their claim 
to acting and expressing freely in that space.  
 The trends in street art, discussed above, support the argument that during 2014 to 2016 
what was previously public space in West Jerusalem was no longer as accessible to Jerusalem’s 
Creative Class. This is demonstrated through the decrease in public expression through street art. 
Something disrupted the Creative Class’ accessibility to public expression. This model considers 
the role of fear-based coercion in obstructing this access.   
5.0 Testing and Rejecting this Model: 
 Based on interview data there is reason to believe that the fear-based model does not 
accurately explain the relationship between the secular creative class and the military and 
security apparatus during times of recent conflict.  
 Of the five street artists formally interviewed within the context of this study, none 
seemed to be coerced, through fear or intimidation, to either yes or not produce public art. 
During none of the interviews were subjects asked to directly define the relationship between the 
Israeli government and their art. All five street artists did, at one point or another, relate their 
inspiration for some of their work, back to their relationship with the Land of Israel, the Israeli 
government, the Zionist movement, and/or their personal experience coming in contact with 
nationalist activities and/or ideologies. From this we can determine that the work of all five 
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artists is influenced, in one way or another, by their relationship to their nation-state and/or 
national identity.  
 Though all five street artists cite national ideology as an inspiration, none showed 
evidence of acting out of fear-based coercion. One artist expressed their respect for the military 
and security apparatus, especially during Operation Protective Edge. This artist noted the irony 
of, at the same time, respecting an institution whilst practicing illegal activity.  
“We all have our roles. Their [the police] role is to maintain order in the streets. My role 
is to bring life to public space. Do I wish we got along better? Sure! But do I hold their 
job against them? Not at all. I have it on good authority they actually like what I do.”105 
 
In contrast, other artists freely ridiculed the Israeli military and security apparatus, without 
showing fear. For instance, Rotem, a Jerusalem based street artist and head of a local artist 
collective, shared with me his deep ridicule of the Israeli military and security organizations.106 
For Rotem this ridicule sometimes drives his creative expression, and at other times does not. “I 
am focusing less on producing and more on creating a platform for others to produce. Maybe 
there are other people like me who are just looking for community and that is why there is less 
art right now.”107 In recent years Rotem has been less active in creating public art, focusing more 
on developing his artist collective.  
 Ami, a Jerusalem based street musician shared a very interesting anecdote about one in 
which the military and security apparatus disrupted his art during Operation Protective Edge. 
During Operation Protective Edge any reservists were called to the front lines in order to 
reinforce the military operation. On July 8, 2014 45,000 IDF reservists were called to the front 
																																																								
105 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017) 
106 Rotem, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017) 
107 Ibid.  
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lines.108 On July 16, 2014 8000 more reservists were called.109 And again, on July 18, 2014, 
18000 reservists were called to serve.110 A young, fit male, living in Jerusalem, Ami was called 
up for reserve duty during summer 2014.  
 I asked Ami if any external, political, or environmental factors had ever influenced his 
desire or lack there of to perform in public. Ami threw his head back and laughed, “Yeah! There 
was the time I was called back as a reservist…”111 Indeed, Ami was one of many artists, 
businessmen, fathers, uncles, and brothers called back to the IDF during Operation Protective 
Edge.  
 Ami continued, “But I don’t think any of my experiences with the IDF hurt my music. 
There is actually this great image of me in uniform, walking to the car to go to base, a guitar 
strung over my shoulder.”112 Ami continued to play music all through his reserve duty in summer 
2014. “It was the only way I could cope. I need my music. And I need others to hear my music. 
And nothing is going to change that. I’ll serve, but I’m sure as hell going to play my music as 
well.” Though Ami showed frustration with the Israeli military for disrupting his daily life, his 
anecdote did not show any fear, or coercive influence.  
 The Israeli military and security apparatus during Operation Protective Edge disrupted 
Ami’s ability to engage in public expression in that it took Ami out of the public eye by bringing 
him to serve in the army. Based on my conversation with Ami, the Israeli military did not 
																																																								
108 "ךרדב הסינכל תיעקרק: טניבקה רשיא סויג 40,000 ילייח םיאולימ תבוטל 'קוצ ןתיא'," םיגורס, July 08, 2014,  
accessed April 26, 2018, (Srugim, Israeli news source) 
http://www.srugim.co.il/82192-טניבקה-רשיא-סויג-45000-ילייח-םיאולימ.  
109	"רשוא סויג יפלא ילייח םיאולימ," Mako, July 16, 2014, , accessed April 26, 2018, (Mako, Israeli news 
source)  
https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-b5c045e159f3741004.htm.		
110 "טניבקה רשיא סייגל דוע 18 ףלא ילייח םיאולימ," הלאוו! תושדח, July 18, 2014, accessed April 26, 2018, 
https://news.walla.co.il/item/2766572. (Walla, Israeli news source)  
111 Ami, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: January 2018) 
112 Ibid. 
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intimidate or coerce him out of performing. There were simply other factors that defined Ami’s 
relationship with the Israeli military and security apparatus. In this case, Ami was a reservist and 
has a duty to serve. Ami felt free to express his art while he served.  
 Based on qualitative data collected through the interview process, I am inclined to reject 
the fear-based model. Each artist gave a different narrative explaining fluctuations in their public 
artistic expressions. For Rotem, his public artistic expression relied on a community. Rotem is 
focusing on creating a vibrant community right now, instead of producing his own art. Ami still 
plays in public spaces. Ami only stopped playing in public when he was called for reserve duty. 
Each street artist had a different opinion about the Israeli military and security organizations. But 
none of the artists interviewed for this study showed any evidence of fear of, or coercion by the 
Israeli military or security apparatus.   
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Chapter Four 
Organizing  Jerusalem Creative Class Street Art 
“Creativity takes courage.113” – Henri Mattise  
1.0 Introduction: 
 In the previous chapter we tested my initial hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
the increase of the Israeli military and security presence and artistic public expressions through 
street art, in West Jerusalem during times of conflict. This hypothesis assumes a direct link 
between the military and security apparatus organizations, and the individual street artist that 
comprise Jerusalem’s creative class. My hypothesis did not anticipate the political intervention 
or significance of any intervening institution between the Israeli security and military 
apparatuses and the individuals in Jerusalem’s creative class who produce street art. Contrary to 
my hypothesis, results from my research suggest that established organization play a significant 
role mediating between Israeli security apparatuses and Jerusalem’s secular creative class.   
 In this chapter, the central narrative still posits that an increase in military and security 
apparatus correlates with a decrease in individuals’ public artistic expression. In order to 
understand this relationship we must also understand the role of several municipality-linked 
organizations that serve as catalysts for secular culture in West Jerusalem. These intervening 
institutions have social and financial ties to the Israeli government apparatus. In addition these 
institutions, since their founding during the Second Intifada, have nurtured and continue to 
support a healthy secular cultural development in West Jerusalem, in the form of street art. This 
chapter shall link the decrease in public artistic participation during operation protective edge 
																																																								
113 Clint Brown, Artist to Artist: Inspiration & Advice from Artists past & Present (Corvallis, OR: 
Jackson Creek, 1998), 62.  
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and the knifing intifada to municipal-linked organizations complying with Israeli military and 
security apparatuses.  




 Figure 3: Organizations as Intervening Institutions, pictured above, describes the 
relationship between the Israeli military and security apparatuses, municipal-linked 
organizations, the Jerusalem secular creative class, and public art in Jerusalem. Let us focus on 
the relationship between the three social bodies in this diagram: the military and security 
apparatus, the municipal-linked organizations, and secular creative class. Fist we shall consider 
the relationship between the municipal-linked organizations and Jerusalem’s secular creative 
class. Several established organizations in Jerusalem are, to a degree, fully responsible to the 
creation and sustenance of secular culture in Jerusalem. In turn, the secular creative class in 
Jerusalem is, when considered on a large scale, fully dependent on institutional structure to 
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maintain their existence. Next we shall consider the relationship between municipality-linked 
organizations and the Israeli military and security apparatus.  
2.0 Relationships Between Social Bodies: 
2.1 Relationship Between Municipal-Linked Organizations and Secular Creative Class: 
 In order to understand the relationship between the secular creative class and municipal-
linked organizations, we must first understand the history of these two bodies. This section shall 
detail the history of the secular creative class in West Jerusalem. In detailing the history of the 
secular creative class, the history of municipal-linked organizations will become apparent.  
2.11 Background of the Secular Creative Class in Jerusalem  
 In order to understand the relationship between the secular creative class and municipal-
linked organizations, we must first understand the history of these two bodies. It is important to 
understand the history of creative secular culture in West Jerusalem, since its rebirth in the wake 
of the Second Intifada. The following section shall discuss how this creative class developed out 
of a larger municipal initiative to rejuvenate daily life in Jerusalem. One central component of 
this initiative was the refurbishing of the city center (colloquially known as ‘Merkaz Ha’ir’- or 
‘The Center of Town’), as the physical home of the secular creative class. In particular, we shall 
pay special attention to organizations as an intervening institution between the Jerusalem 
Municipality and the secular creative class.  
 Israeli secular and religious national creative culture flourished from around the time of 
the Six Day War until turn of the 21st century. As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Israel’s 
1967 military victory was the start of a new era of Israeli dominance in West Jerusalem. Indeed 
the second half of the 20th century saw Jewish Israeli’s establish West Jerusalem as their 
religious, political, and cultural home. Some of the cultural foundation developed during this 
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period, include: the opening of the Israel Museum in Jerusalem in 1965, as well as the 
development of Ben Yehuda and Jaffa road in West Jerusalem as the central commercial and 
cultural districts in the city.114  
 During this time the neighborhood known as Lev Ha’ir (translated to mean ‘the heart of 
the city) developed into a commercial and cultural capital of West Jerusalem.115 Unlike many 
cities, Jerusalem’s metropolitan center and surrounding neighborhoods is home to the majority of 
the city’s inhabitants. Indeed 71% of Jerusalem residents reside in the metropolitan center. The 
significance of this number can be understood in contrast to other large cities in Israel, such as 
Haifa (in which 55% reside near the center) or Tel Aviv (where 11% of the city’s inhabitants 
reside near the center).116 The physical space of the city center in Jerusalem serves a special 
purpose in that it is immediately accessible to many of the residents of West Jerusalem.  
 The first and second intifadas succeeded in diminishing much of what had been 
developed in Jerusalem117 in the latter half of the 20th century. During this time many of the 
secular creative abandoned the city in search of a more politically tame horizon. In particular, the 
violence of the intifadas prompted many secular and traditional Israeli Jewish Jerusalem 
residents to move out of the city, towards Tel Aviv. For instance, … “After the First and Second 
Intifadas. “A whole generation left Jerusalem,” she said.118” This left the scene bereft of vitality 
and stunted the creative development in the city. According to one street artists, “during the 
																																																								
114 Daṿid Ḳroyanḳer, Ha-Meshulash Ha-Yerushalmi: Biyografyah Urbanit (Yerushalayim: Keter, 2011).  
115 Ibid.  
116 2016 לארשיל יטסיטטס ןותנש, Israel’s Statistical Yearbook 2016, Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research	
117 An interesting study might compare the cultural lull during this time period, to the cultural lull 
documented during the Second Intifada. This comparison is outside the scope of this particular study. 
Still, I find it important to note, that at first glance, there seems to be a similarity between these two time 
periods; both in terms of military and security measures, as well as in terms of levels of secular cultural 
vibrancy, as observed through anecdotal evidence.    
118 Tom Teicholz, "The Culture of Jerusalem Itself," The Huffington Post, December 07, 2017, accessed 
April 25, 2018 
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Intifada it was silent. I would go to a play and there would be a room full of chairs. The streets 
were empty. It was sad.”119 In this quote the artist describes how during the Second Intifada 
Jerusalem became culturally bare. Those who stayed in Jerusalem remained uncertain as to the 
cause of the culturally barren state. On the one hand the violence of the Intifada stunted the 
physical capacity of the city to produce culture. But there was also an increasing sensation that 
the creatives in the city were abandoning Jerusalem as a culturally vibrant local.  
 In response to the depleted state of Jerusalem’s economic and cultural scenes the 
Jerusalem Municipality, together with the Jerusalem Development Authority, established an 
effort to revitalize Jerusalem’s urban livelihood. The city center renewal plan- unprecedented in 
Israel- received considerable funding from the Israeli Government. Despite the prevailing sense 
that Jerusalem was a ‘lost cause’ all parties involved believed the city could return to a healthy 
urban state.120 This effort was based on European case studies and embodied the belief that 
healthy culture leads to economic progress.121  
 A central component of the revitalization plan was refurbishing and planning the physical 
space in the city center in such a way that would invite secular creatives to the space. In 2011 the 
Jerusalem Center for Israel Studies published a report examining these efforts to revitalize 
Jerusalem’s city center. The following quote demonstrates how central the physical space in the 
city center of Jerusalem was to this revitalization effort:  
“Behind the plan is the premise that downtown Jerusalem is the city’s “beating heart,” 
and that proper functioning of this heart is essential if the city as a whole is to thrive.”122  																																																								
119 Rotem, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017) 
120 Amnon Ramon, Aviel Yelinek, and Asaf Vitman, eds., "Downtown Jerusalem:The Story of 
Jerusalem's City Center and Its Regeneration," Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Series, 410th ser. 
(2011):. 
121 Aviel Yelinek. "Culture As A Tool For Urban Regeneration." Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. 
122 Amnon Ramon, Aviel Yelinek, and Asaf Vitman, eds., "Downtown Jerusalem:The Story of 




This quote refers to downtown Jerusalem (referred to in this study as the city center, or Merkaz 
Ha’ir) as the city’s “beating heart.” This nickname is more than just a play on the name of the 
neighborhood beside the city center, Lev Ha’ir (translated to mean ‘heart of the city’). This 
nickname recognizes that the space in the city center must be a vibrant commercial and cultural 
zone in order for Jerusalem at large to be considered a vibrant, and culturally relevant city.   
 The early years of the rejuvenation effort seemed to take effect and yield positive results. 
As the violence subsided, and the streets were cleaned, culture began to flow through the streets 
of Jerusalem. One of the early public, cultural celebrations in the revitalized city was the ‘Arting 
in Jerusalem’ festival, organized by Israeli artist, Liron Meshulem. The festival brought together 
works by fifty plus artists, both from within Israel, as well as from around the globe. In an 
editorial of the festival, Scott Sherry reports the following: 
“Arting in Jerusalem’ was conceived an organized by Israeli artist Liron Meshulem, who 
sought to show work that would have a positive impact upon the political and religious 
tensions that are a feature of daily like in Jerusalem. Though it was no different in its 
approach to public art projects in western Europe, what made Arting Jerusalem so 
extraordinary was the fact that there was no real precedent for a project of that nature in 
the city, primarily because of the threat of terrorist attacks.”123  
 
Indeed, this editorial recognizes the significance of the ‘Arting in Jerusalem’ festival. The 
editorial cites the lack of precedent for the culturally vibrant event. At first glance this festival 
indeed seems unprecedented in the wake of rising terrorism, violence, and security and military 
policy enforcement.  
2.12 Organizations For Development 
 From the outside the secular cultural scene in Jerusalem seems to function as a 
grassroots, civil society ecosystem. In the early stages of this study I believed the creative class 
in Jerusalem was an authentic expression from Jerusalem residents, independent of institutional 																																																								
123 Scott Sherry, "Arting in Jerusalem," A-n Magazine, December 2003.  
	 67	
intervention. In reality, a series of formal organizatioins catalyzed (and continue to play an 
integral role in sustaining) Jerusalem’s secular creative class since the cultural lull during the 
Second Intifada. The following section shall discuss the Eden Company (henceforth referred to 
as Eden) and the Mekudeshet initiative as two examples of such organizations. This section shall 
then provide examples of ways in which these institutions intervene in creating and sustaining 
the secular creative class in Jerusalem in the years after the Second Intifada.   
 2.12a Eden: 
 In 2001, as part of the municipal rejuvenation effort the Jerusalem Municipality founded 
Eden as an associative branch of the Jerusalem Development Authority. Eden was founded in 
order to ensure there was a special arm of the municipality devoted to commercial development. 
Eden engages in several types of projects. For one, the organization is mandated with preserving 
the physical appearance of the space in the city center. This is to ensure that the space does not 
become dilapidated as it was in the turn of the 21st century. Another type of project Eden engages 
in the ensuring there is cultural vibrancy in the secular creative class. This is because cultural 
vibrancy is on factor that drives commercial and economic activity.  
 The Jerusalem Development Authority’s website introduces Eden: 
“… as a statutory authority under the Jerusalem Development Authority Law (1988). The 
company’s Board of Directors includes representatives of the Jerusalem Development 
Authority, the municipality, and the government. The Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of Eden is the Mayor of Jerusalem. The boundaries of its activities were approved by the 
City Council.”124 
 
Eden was founded as an arm of the Jerusalem Development Authority. This means the 
municipality and government have total control over the activities and efforts perused under 
Eden’s authority. This does not mean that Eden is inherently biased towards government 																																																								
124 "About the Company," JDA - Eden the Jerusalem Center Development Company, , accessed April 25, 
2018, http://www.jda.gov.il/template/default_e.aspx?CID=23&PId=170.    
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ideology. Eden’s purpose is to develop economic and commercial vibrancy through cultivating a 
healthy creative class, not to propagate political views. But this does mean that anything Eden 
des must comply with government policy, even if at the cost of commercial and cultural 
vibrancy.    
 2.12b Mekudeshet  
 The Mekudeshet initiative is another organization playing an active role in stimulating 
public art and culture in West Jerusalem. The Mekudeshet initiative, a sub-initiative of the Lynn 
Schusterman Foundation, hosts a series of elaborate cultural events. The initiative began in 2011 
by organizing a festival in the center of the city. The following excerpt is taken from the 
Mekudeshet initiative’s website, published in 2016: 
“For the last five years, we have been exploring Jerusalem, drawing inspiration from the 
city and turning it into the raw material for our artistic productions. We have sought out 
ways to present Jerusalem as a place that is both holy and secular. We have tried to create 
art that expresses the inherent tension between the pas, present and future and to turn 
Jerusalem into a city of contemporary culture.”125 
 
The excerpt demonstrates how at the core of Mekudeshet is the desire to bring contemporary 
culture into Jerusalem. The initiative seeks to preserve the integrity of the city, as well as draw 
inspiration from Jerusalem’s ethnic complexity.  
 The link between Mekudeshet and the Jerusalem Municipality is not as strong at the link 
between Eden and the municipality. While Eden’s link to the munnicipality is financial, 
Mekudeshet’s link to the Municipality is primarily social. Many of the staff members working 
with Mekudeshet have strong professional and social ties to municipal bodies. The Mekudeshet 
initiative is also a registered non-for-profit foundation. The link between Mekudeshet and the 
Jerusalem Municipality is strongest in Mekudeshet is recognized by the municipality, and by the 																																																								
125 "Mekudeshet," Jerusalem Season of Culture, , accessed April 25, 2018, 
http://en.mekudeshet.com/about-us/.  
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creative community in Jerusaelm at large, in an official (profesional, financial, and social) 
capacity.  
2.2 Cultural Vibrancy Dependant on Formal Intervening Institutions: 
 These two institutions, among others, provide a series of initiatives in effort to stimulate 
culture in Jerusalem. Institutions cultivate and sustain secular culture in Jerusalem by simulating, 
on a micro-scale, authentic cultural participation in every-day life. They also do things such as 
organize large festivals and other cultural platforms to bring independent artists together. The 
Eden organization paying street performers and commissioning graffiti artists, the founding of 
Hamifal, and the Jerusalem Season of Culture (JSOC), are examples of how intervening 
institutions simulate (in order to stimulate) culture in West Jerusalem.  
  In order to maintain cultural vibrancy in West Jerusalem the Eden organization 
stimulates authentic appearances of a healthy creative class ecosystem. The first example of this 
is the organization recruiting and paying street performers, such as musicians and acrobats, to 
stand on public, commercial streets in the center of the city, and perform for the public. 
According to Ron, a staff member at the Eden initiative: 
“This is done from the understanding that also the Jerusalem artists need to learn to get 
used to this type of art, the type of art that stimulates commercial activity. And also this 
introduces this type of art to the people of Jerusalem (the spectators) who then begin to 
digest and absorb and normalize this commercial incentivized art.And if we want that this 
occurrence will happen by itself, then we need for several years to help it along.” 126 
 
As explained in this quote, what Eden is seeking todo is ‘teach’ the Jerusalem creative class how 
to channel their creative activity. Hiring and placing street performers in public space in order to 
simulate individual creative expression on the city streets, might serve as a catalyst for vibrant 
creative culture.  
																																																								
126 Ron, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)   
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 It is posisble that this endevour indeed convinces passers by, Jerusalem creatives and 
residents alike, that the city actually does breed cultural vibrancy. My conversaton with Moshe, a 
young Jerusalem-born resident, exhibits how people in Jerusalem percieve these inititiatives as 
authentic expressions from individual members of Jerusalems creatie class. Moshe, when told 
that sometimes street performers are commusioned by Eden, responded with: “I had no idea! 
You mean they get double? I always drop coins to contribute to their performance. But you’re 
telling me they get what I give and they get the commision.127” Indeed it is not widely known 
that Eden served this purpose to simulate cultural vibrancy on the streets of Jerusalem. Therefor 
it is possible Eden’s efforts do inspire individual creatives to participate in public artistic 
expression.  
 Another example of Eden’s authentic cultural simulation, in effort to catalyze creative 
participation, is the comissining of graffiti on specific walls around the city center. One specific 
place that has garnered a lot of attention recently is Hamifal (The Factory). In 2016 Eden, in 
collaboration with other artist collectives, took an abandandoned building in the center of the city 
and repurposed it for creative use. Today the building is open to any artist who wishes to paint 
on the walls, or use the space for expression. The building is open to the public, and even 
includes a cooperative café in the abandoned kitchen. The kitchen is open to all who wish to use 
it.128 The walls of the building are full of art, and the rooms contain various three-dimensional 
works (Image Nine).  
 Jerusalem Season of Culture (JSOC) run by the Mekudeshet initiative, is another example 
of how insitituions stimulate cuture in West Jerusalem. At the end of every summer Mekudeshet 
hotsts JSOC- a month long series of artistic, cultural, and educational events, around Jerusalem. 																																																								
127 Moshe, in-person informal conversation, (Katamon, Jerusalem: March 23, 2018) 
128 Ido, in-person informal conversation (Jerusalem: August 31, 2017) 
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The organizors work around the calendar year finding talented artists and cultural leaders, who 
embody and express the plurality and complexity embedded in Jerusalem. The events in JSOC 
range from gatherings in rooftop bars where guests sip on arak or Israeli wine and listen to 
middle eastern musicians chant psalms and traditional Mizrachi129 poetry. Other events take 
place in the Old City of Jerusalem in enclaves of Greek and Roman ruins. Acrobats dance around 
the Tower of David, and performers line the streets in the center of town. JSOC specifically 
brings together Israeli and Palestinian artists, in an effort to unite communities and breed 
coexistance. The sereis of events is a fantastic accomplishment.   
 JSOC is indeed a vervent cultural force in Jerusalem. So much so that it can be perceived 
as an infrustructure within itself that sustains vibrant creative culture in West Jerusalem. The 
following quote demonstrates the range of JSOC’s impact on the cultural scene in Jerusalem:  
“JSOC seized an opportunity to commission original work, including pieces that were 
site-specific to Jerusalem. In doing so, JSOC created an infrastructure for the arts and 
artists – all of the festivals under JSOC’s umbrellas have artistic directors as well as 
producers, creating year-round work and cementing JSOC’s role in sustaining creative 
life in the city.”130  
 
By holding JSOC every year, Mekudeshet created a framework to house and sustain members of 
Jerusalem’s creative class. This is helpful in sustain cultural vibrancy in Jerusalem and 
motivating creative people to produce more. This also means that if ever anything were to 
happen to Mekudeshet, or JSOC as an organization, then creative production and expression in 
Jerusalem would be halted.   
 The efforts and projects associated with Eden and the Mekudeshet initiatives are indeed 
impressive. Together these initiatives are responsible for the most exciting and culturally vibrant 																																																								
129 Mizrachi is a term for eastern culture referring to culture and practice originating in Iraq, Iran, Yemen, 
and other Middle Eastern communities.  
130 Tom Teicholz, "The Culture of Jerusalem Itself," The Huffington Post, December 07, 2017, accessed 
April 25, 2018 
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spaces and happening in West Jerusalem. This study appreciates the actions and efforts taken by 
the Eden and Mekudeshet initiatives. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the state of 
commercial and cultural vibrancy during the Second Intifada was depleted. So much so that a 
generation of creative fled the city in search of more accommodating creative spaces131. This 
tudy does not question that these initiatives have reversed this pattern and given Jerusalem a 
newborn cultural and creative spirit. Having said this, it is important to consider the implications 
of such a relationship between cultural institutions and creative vitality in an urban setting. 
Specifically, it this study argues that prior to and during the violence and security increase in 
summer 2014, the creative class in Jerusalem was dependent on institutions such as Eden and 
Mekudeshet.  
 Though it seems to the naked eye that Jerusalem has a healthy and independent creative 
class, in reality there are established organizations at the core of the cultural vibrancy. Outside of 
the projects (such as Hamifal and JSOC, described above), there is little cultural vibrancy in the 
city. It is outside the scope of this project, and perhaps premature, to assume institutions are the 
cause of latent cultural participation. Institutions do not squander vibrancy. Indeed it is in the 
very interest, and mission statement, of the Eden institution, for Jerusalem to have an 
independent creative class to help stimulate commercial activity. Such an independent creative 
class did not exist in Jerusalem in 2014-2016, at least not on a significantly large scale.  
Hearat Shulaim- An Independent Artist Collective:  
 At this point it is important to point out that not all artist collective were fully dependent 
on municipal-linked organizations in the wake of the Second Intifada. One example of this is the 
																																																								
131 Discussed near the beginning of section 2.1 
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work of the artist collective ‘Hearat Shulaim.’132 The founding members of the collective write 
the following:   
“We wanted to comment on various aspects of the local reality, art politics, and the 
relationship between art and Jerusalem in urban space… This project was intentionally 
produced without any external official, political or economic support, which kept us free 
of institutional interference, free of political considerations, and free of the need to ally 
ourselves with local and international organs and institutions whose policies and interests 
we don’t agree with.”133  
 
Heara’s desire to remain independent of broad institutional effect is indeed at the center of the 
collective’s ideology. And in fact, Heara’s seclusion from any institutional structure allowed it to 
act independently. Moreover, their independence allowed them to react in an authentic manner to 
the social and political realities of that time.  
 Hearat Shulaim operated in the following manner. The collective produced a series of 
events, referred to as Heara’s. For instance the first event is referred to as, ‘Heara 1,’ the second 
event as, ‘Heara 2,’ and so on. The Heara is a curated and showcase of works, all connected by a 
common theme. The showcases were open for a single event and were open to the public. Along 
with each public event, the Heara collective published a journal. In fact, the journal was the 
original intention of the collective’s founders. Only after considering the importance of public 
space in cultivating culture did the founders decide to host events, or public art showcases, with 
every journal publication. Each event took place in a precisely chosen public space. Much 
deliberation went into choosing the location for each Heara. The location of each Heara was 
intended to carry significance associated with the broad theme, or idea of each event.  
 Heara 2, the collective’s second exhibition held at the Saydoff Courtyard, is particularly 
noteworthy. This event demonstrates the how Heara’s independent from any intervening 																																																								
132 Hebrew term for ‘Note in the Margins.’  
133 Ronen Eidelman, et. al. Heara: Independent Art in Jerusalem at the Beginning of the 21st Century. 
(Jerusalem: Heʻarat Shulayim and the Underground Academy, 2014), 346.  
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institution, afforded it authentic freedom of expression. The Saydoff Courtyard, located in the 
city center, was comprised of artist studios and workshops and stood adjacent to Jewish Ultra-
Orthodox neighborhoods. The event was scheduled for 8:00pm on the evening of Friday April 
12, 2001. The event organizers recount that the timing of the event was significant as it was “… 
just after the start of the Sabbath and a controversial time according to the usual Jerusalem	
schedule.134” The artist collective was making a deliberate political claim against the orthodox 
sect by scheduling the event during the welcoming of the Sabbath.  
 Hours before the event, and just 100 meters away from the courtyard, there was a suicide 
bombing. The suicide bombing took place at around 4:00pm, in the Mahane Yehuda market 
place. The market place, formerly the economic center of West Jerusalem, now serves as a 
tourist attraction, commercial organ, and home to many Jerusalemites.  
 With hours to the scheduled event, the Heara collective had to decide if to proceed with 
Heara 2, or cancel in light of the recent violence, security precautions, and/or out of respect for 
the tragedy. After much deliberation the collective decided to go forth with the planned Heara. In 
the context of increased violence and security awareness, the collective decided in favor of 
pursuing their planned public cultural expression. The collective’s total independence from any 
larger organizational structure enabled them to pursue creative expression in times of conflict.135  
 Indeed the Heara collective is an example of the type of independent secular creative 
class culture that is missing from Jerusalem. The presence of such a group potentially discredits 
the central argument that such independent artistic practice was dormant at this time. The 
following two points arguably reconcile this contradiction: in 2009 the artist collective partnered 
																																																								
134 Ibid.  
135 Ronen Eidelman, et. al. Heara: Independent Art in Jerusalem at the Beginning of the 21st Century. 
(Jerusalem: Heʻarat Shulayim and the Underground Academy, 2014), 346. 
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with the Jerusalem Foundation,136 an organization with deep financial and social ties to the 
municipal cultural development network. The fact that Heara ultimately collaborated with the 
Jerusalem Foundation is evidence of their dependence on this network of foundations and 
established organizations. Second, many artists who began their careers with the Heara collective 
moved on to help build Hamifal and other projects, in collaboration with municipal-linked 
institutions.137  
2.2 Relationship between military and security apparatus, and institutions:  
 The previous section considered the relationship between the creative class and 
intervening, municipality-linked institutions. The section concluded that in West Jerusalem, 
during Operation Protective Edge, the secular creative class was dependent on municipality-
linked institutions. Let us now consider the relationship between the intervening institutions and 
the Israeli military and security apparatus.  
 Institutions that are socially or financially linked to municipal organizations are 
especially influenced by government policy. The relationship yields compliance on behalf of the 
organization towards government policy. In this case intervening municipal-linked institutions 
were significantly influenced, and readily complied with Israeli military and security apparatus 
policy. The cultural lull, or silence of the creative class in West Jerusalem can be explained as a 
filtered down effect, through intervening institutions, originating with Israeli military and 
security policy.  
 There are a plethora of minor examples that demonstrate this relationship. One major 
example is the case festival organizers postponing JSOC until after the military operation. JSOC 
was scheduled to host 31 days of cultural and artistic events in Jerusalem as part of JSOC 2014. 																																																								
136 Ibid. 19-20 
137 Ibid.  
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The opening night of the festival was scheduled to take place on Thursday evening, July 10, 
2014. Days before the scheduled opening, at the start of the military operation, festival 
organizers cancelled the first events. According to an article published by The Times of Israel, 
JSOC organizers are quoted at follows, “As long as the war continues, the Jerusalem Season of 
Culture’s events will not carry on as planned. We look forward to the quickest possible end to 
the conflict and will resume our normal activities the moment a ceasefire is announced.”138 The 
organizers cancelled the event in light of the increase in violence and military operations taking 
place in the area of Jerusalem. In place of an in-person event in physical space, the festival 
organizers organized a several-day-long radio show. The show was broadcast to the public and 
was meant to embrace in the spirit of the festival. Each day the radio show was broadcast from 
different stations around the city in order to capture the plurality that thrives in Jerusalem. 139  
 Contrary to the Heara collective, JSOC decided to cancel cultural events in the face of 
increased conflict. I argue that JSOC’s official capacity as an established organization 
recognized by the Jerusalem Municipality, in other words, their status, influenced the decision to 
comply with Israeli military and security norms. In the case of Heara 2, the independence of the 
organization relieved the organizers of any external pressure to react to a changing military or 
security climate. JSOC did not have the advantage of this independence. JSOC’s status as an 
established organization, associated with an esteemed foundation, meant their actions carried 
currency beyond simply representing the artists in the creative class. The following statement 
made by festival organizers during the operation demonstrates JSOC’s compliance: “Were not 
really back to routine, and we don’t think we can celebrate the end of summer or dance like 																																																								
138 Jessica Steinberg, "Another Summer Event Bites the Dust," The Times of Israel, July 20, 2014, , 
accessed April 27, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/another-summer-event-bites-the-dust/.  
139 _____. "Promoters Hold out Hope for Some Culture This Summer," The Times of Israel, July 30, 
2014, , accessed April 27, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/promoters-hold-out-hope-for-some-
culture-this-summer/.  
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nothing’s happened.”140 The violence and the presence of a military operation coerced JSOC 
festival organizers out of hosting their planned cultural events. It is possible that if JSOC was not 
as well established, or well regarded amongst the leaders of Jerusalem, they would not have felt 
the need to cancel in times of turmoil.  
 
Independent (Religious) Creativity: 
 This study observed that much of the creative class went silent during Operation 
Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada. The previous section presents a model suggesting that 
there are institutions that intervene in the creative class’s independent creative platform. This 
intervention results in the creative class producing less when intervening institutions are unable 
to support their creative efforts. Let us consider one example of an independent creative team 
that did become very active during summer 2014.  
 The following anecdote is based on a series of interviews with the artists Barel and 
Souza, as well as members of the Jerusalem street art community, at large. Barel moved to 
Jerusalem in 2011. He first saw Souza’s artwork on the streets of Jerusalem in 2012. From the 
first time Barel saw Souza’s work, he knew Souza was a special artist. “Whenever I saw blank 
walls I would call him” explained Barel, “The thing is the city has painted over murals that he 
had done voluntarily so he left Jerusalem.”141 Between 2012 and 2014 Barel made several minor 
attempts to collaborate with Souza, but nothing came of it until 2014.  
 In 2014 Barel was walking through the Mahane Yehuda marketplace (henceforth referred 
to as the ‘shuk’) on a Saturday afternoon. Barel remarks how the shuk was empty, the shutters 
closed, and the quiet of the Sabbath was in the air, but the city felt empty. As Barel tells the 																																																								
140 _____. "Jerusalem's Summer of Culture Rescheduled for August's End," The Times of Israel, August 
14, 2014, , accessed April 25, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/contact-point-redux-for-the-season/.  
141 Barel, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017) 
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story, “I’m looking at the empty shutters and I’m like ‘what an eye sore.’ But there was one little 
piece of art that made me happy. It was painted on this shop shutter.”142 The piece of art to which 
Barel is referring is a mural done in 2011 by a street artist named Sinai. Barel continues, “As I 
continued walking up towards Jaffa [street] I saw a mural that Solomon [Souza] produced in 
2012. And that’s when I was like, ok this is real and I went dragging his ass back to Jerusalem 
and we’re doing this.”143 So Barel brought Souza back to Jerusalem with a vision to revive the 
space and breath vibrant culture into the area. And once Souza was back in Jerusalem, his work 
started popping up on walls and corners around the city. 
Indeed when Souza came back to Jerussalem he immediately began spraying the walls of the 
city. One artist, referencing Souza’s work, says the following: 
“Souza. He threw up on this city. Now everywhere you look you can’t get away from 
him. His faces of established figures and these colors and shapes. He took over 
Jerusalem. It has been three years now of Souza!144” 
 
In this particular quote the artist has a critical tone. This particular artist has been working on the 
streets of Jerusalem for over twenty years. In talking about Souza he is referencing the time 
period in between 2014 and 2017 (when this interview was conducted).  
 Barel and Souza produced a lot of work in their first months working together (the end of 
2014) both in the shuk and around Jerusalem. But over time Barel formalized his initial vision. 
His initial vision, says Barel, was to produce a mural gallery along the shop shutters of the 
market place.  
“The idea is to create like a massive Kiddush.145 That would showcase the multiplicity of 
Israeli ethnicity with Shabbat tables from each community within our nation upholding 																																																								
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)  
145 A Kiddush is a traditional gathering that takes place on the Sabbath where someone blesses a glass of 
wine and the community partakes in a light meal. It is similar to a cocktail hour, where refreshments are 
served and people mingle.  
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their own unique fashion, culinary, and singing traditions. And to try and create an all-
inclusive standard that would appeal to everyone without excluding anyone. That is what 
the shuk is, what Nachlaot146 represents, what this country represents.”147  
 
There is a term in the Hebrew Bible called kibbutz galuyot, or an in gathering of the nations. 
Barel’s vision was to simulate this in gathering in the form of vibrant cultural participation in the 
shuk.   
 In the beginning shop owners were hesitant. One said yes, then another and another. 
Several shop owners asked for portraits or rabbis as they thought they would bring luck to their 
business and their household. “Guys originally said no, but then they saw they we could paint 
some rabbis. These guys, they are indifferent to art, but they think the rabbi will bring good luck. 
So we ended up with this gallery of rabbis.”148 
 All of this started in summer 2014 and continued through 2016. At the beginning there 
was almost no nightlife, only one bar in the shuk, and Barel and Souza painting rabbis for shop 
owners. Slowly over the course of that summer, as cultural events hosted by organization, around 
the city closed down, the shuk began to fill up. As the murals gained popularity, Barel and Souza 
harnessed their social capital with the shop owners to start deciding which figures to paint.  
 On multiple occasions Barel tried to reach out to organizations for financial support. Each 
time he reached out he was met with unwelcoming greetings. Barel attributes this to a stigma 
associated with the project- that the murals are inherently religious. “Because of the rabbis and 
the biblical scenes we had this stigma of being too Jewish, and the people involved in the cultural 
renaissance in Jerusalem kind of shunned us.”149 Because the artists were considered religious 
none of the organizations wanted to risk being blamed as bias. It is puzzling that in this instance 																																																								
146 Nachlaot is the neighborhood next to the shuk. 




the religious community, often considered to be closed and less culturally stimulating, was 
producing vibrant culture, while the secular creative class experienced a lull.  
 Barel and Souza did succeed in bringing life to the shuk. And their work inspired an 
ingathering of different cultures. This is best highlighted by an anecdote told by Lev, a student in 
Jerusalem who is familiar with the street artist community. Lev recalls one image of how the 
murals in the shuk have inspired pluralism: 
“You see a young secular kid in ripped jeans and a white t-shirt smoking hookah at a bar. 
And this kid is leaning his back on a portrait of Maimonides. All while Mizrachi music 
plays in the background and people take shots around him. The contradiction between 
secular and religious is playing out right before my eyes. But it works, the worlds are 
twisting together.” 
 
Indeed, to this day the shuk is the center of nightlife in the city. It is home to the secular creative 




1.0 Summary of Results: 
 Eighty odd pages later, let us remind ourselves why we are here. It is to answer the 
following question:  
How did the increased activity of the IDF during the summer of 2014 Operation 
Protective Edge influence political-cultural street art in West Jerusalem?   
Answer: Probably not, and to the extent it did it was indirect.  
In effort to answer this question, this study has yielded three notable results:  
1) Decline in street art production:  
 As detailed in chapter three, this study observed a decline in street art production in 2014 
and 2016, and low levels of street art production in 2015. First and foremost this finding is 
significant in that it allows us to consider what, if any, role increasing security and military 
presence plays in decreasing public artistic expression. The methodological rigor used to analyze 
street art production levels in order to arrive at this finding, adds a degree of legitimacy to 
Hypothesis 2.  
 After four years as an undergraduate student of social science (primarily political science 
and economics), I have observed the following. What distinguishes social science research, as a 
discipline, is its ability to rigorously discern patterns of social behavior. In order to ensure rigor, 
the social scientist turns to the scientific method. Implicit in scientific methods of inquiry is 
measurement. It is not immediately apparent which method should the social scientist employ in 
analyzing broad, and frustratingly vague, phenomena, such as ‘cultural vibrancy.’ Even after 
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isolating street art/graffiti as a measure of cultural vibrancy associated with the creative class, 
there remain a series of daunting methodological challenges.  
 The second point of significance is the methodological labor that led to this finding. 
Culture, artistic production, creative initiative, these are all cornerstones of collective expression. 
They are difficult to measure, but that does not mean we should not try. This study joins growing 
efforts in attempting to rigorously analyze cultural vibrancy through street art. It is the first of its 
kind to gather street art data in a single point in time and retroactively date the unit of graffiti’s 
time of production. I hope this study motivates future researchers to overcome these 
methodological challenges and attempt to rigorously analyze components of social and political 
material culture.  
2) Rejecting the Fear-Based Model: 
 A second result of this study is rejecting a fear-based model to explain the relationship 
between an increase in Israeli military and security apparatus presence, and Israeli creative 
vitality in West Jerusalem. Interviews with Jerusalem based street artists, conducted for the 
purpose of this study, yielded little evidence to support a fear-based model. This result is 
significant in that it contributes to the body of knowledge about how artists in West Jerusalem 
relate to military and security organizations.  
3) Municipality-Linked Organizations as Intervening Institutions:  
 When I asked this question, back in September 2017, I assumed there existed an 
independent creative class in West Jerusalem. A third result of this study indicates there are 
intervening institutions supporting the creative class in West Jerusalem. Furthermore, evidence 
gathered over the course of this study suggests the creative class in Jerusalem is not a function of 
individual grassroots public expression. As a result, Jerusalem’s creative class is susceptible to 
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institutional influences. This is observed during Operation Protective Edge wherein cultural 
vibrancy in Jerusalem decreased in part because municipal-linked institutions complied with 
Israeli military and security policy.   
2.0 Implications: 
2.1 Implications for Future Military and Security Policy: 
 It is difficult to navigate the public-private space. It is true that the primary objective of 
the military and security apparatus is, and by all means should stay, to take offensive and 
defensive measures to protect its citizenry. Sometimes these efforts may come at the cost of 
absolute free individual public creative expression, or may trespass on any other individual 
freedom. The question becomes, to whom does the responsibility fall to protect the individual 
freedoms of a society? Is it the responsibility of the military and security apparatus? Or is it the 
responsibility of the people, independent of the military and security apparatus? The answer to 
these thought experiments are well beyond the scope of this study. What is clear from this study 
is that there must be a citizenry that stands independent of the military and security apparatus if 
free creative expression is to weather the trials of violent conflict.  
2.2 Implications for Future Urban Development Policy: 
 These results have several implications future urban development policy in Jerusalem. 
First it is important to reiterate that these intervening institutions likely do more good than bad. 
The cultural lull during the Second Intifada warranted significant intervention. These results 
indicate that the task at hand now is to transition the institutionally grown creative class into an 
independently thriving, grassroots pubic artistic expression. The exact policy path towards an 
independent creative class is well beyond the scope of this study. But these findings highlight 
that perhaps the creative class in Jerusalem is ready to function independently.  
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 These findings also highlight the importance of considering the character of a city when 
adapting development policy. The Jerusalem Development Authority adapted urban development 
policies that originated in European cities such as Dublin, Berlin, and Paris. One lesson we can 
take away from this study is that not all cities are the same. In particular, urban development 
policy suited to European cities may not be fit for Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a conflict prone city 
and is home to a diverse ethnic base. Urban development policy cannot simply be copied from 
European cities. Rather, municipal officials must consider the Jerusalem creative class’s specific 
needs, and tailor policy towards them. This will allow for an easier transition to an independent 
creative class in Jerusalem, in years to come.  
3.0 Remaining Puzzles and Call for Further Research: 
 There are two ways in which this study can be extended: 
1) First is continued research into the relationship between increase in violence and military and 
security dominance, and individual grassroots creative class public artistic expression. One way 
in which these findings are extendible is to consider different social cleavages. This study 
considered only the secular and religious-national segments of West Jerusalem’s Israeli 
population. It would be interesting to conduct the same study and consider the ultra-orthodox 
population in West Jerusalem.  
2) Second are the collected questions, tangentially related to this study, that are worth further 
exploration. I have done my best to note in the footnotes when such a question arises. Here are 
some of these questions, or paths of further inquiry. 
• Further research into West Jerusalem’s creative class. Specifically to what extent is the 
creative class dependent on intervening institutions?  
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The relationship between West Jerusalem’s creative class and intervening institutions only 
became clear during the research phase of this study. This finding is itself a basis for further 
research into the degree to which the creative class is dependent, as well as the implications of 
such a relationship.  
• Comparing levels of cultural vibrancy, both in Jerusalem, as well as within Israel at large, 
across times of military conflict.  
Another interesting question that became clear during the research phase of this study is the 
question of a cultural lull in West Jerusalem during the Second Intifada. Unlike the cultural lull 
between 2014 and 2016, the lull during the Second Intifada is well cited. It is even formally 
recognized as a basis for municipal and national policy, seeking to rejuvenate urban commercial 
life through stimulating culture, post Second Intifada. It would be interesting to compare cultural 
vibrancy across different military operations.  
 
   




1.0 Street Art Data Collection and Analysis: 
1.1 Data Collection: 
 The data presented in Figure 1: Street Art Production in Jerusalem (2012-2017) considers 
only data points collected by myself during August 2017. In the summer of 2017 I walked the 
streets of Jerusalem a photographed graffiti and street art. Originally I collected 368 pictures of 
graffiti/street art. During the initial stages of this study I believe mapping street art would be a 
significant portion of my research. This did not pan out as I rejected the fear-based model in 
chapter three. Therefor I did not need to know where graffiti is drawn, as there is no evidence for 
a correlation between spaces where there is increase in military and security presence and street 
art production. None-the-less I stored all of my data on the Fulcrum data collection Internet 
application. My data collection method follows a method developed at NYU. This is discussed in 
Chapter One under Methodology.  
 A note on Souza and Barel’s work: I did not photograph any of the murals in the shuk. I 
did photograph Souza’s other work around Jerusalem. I felt this best represented graffiti 
production in the city and captured how the shuk is, after all, an isolated place. 
1.2 Image Analysis: 
After collecting the data I aggregated the images. In some cases I had taken multiple pictures of 
the same piece in order to isolate the text of the piece. When collecting the data I photographed 
everything that could potentially be considered graffiti/street art, even those tags that were 
clearly vandalism. In analyzing the data, I parsed out the images that were clearly reckless 
vandalism. 
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Cleaning the data in this manner I was left with 261 isolated units of graffiti. It is likely that there 
were more units of graffiti in my sample that I did not detect. This is due to the fact that graffiti 
layers on top of itself. I isolated only graffiti units that I could clearly see.  
 For each of the 261 units of graffiti I analyzed them in order to determine the time they 
were produced. In some cases I consulted with street artists, members of Jerusalem’s street art 
community, and/or private archives of Jerusalem street art, in order to accurately determine the 
time period or date of creation.  
1.3 Possible Biases in Collection and Analysis: 
 The process of classifying graffiti according to time created differs based on the type of 
image being analyzed. Some images capture a single mural. In these cases it is easy to classify 
this data point and determine the time period in which it was created. Other images capture a 
‘rolling wall of graffiti.’ These are images of surfaces that have different street art contributions 
from a variety of street artists, each attaching their work at a different point in time. In these 
cases it becomes harder to classify each individual piece of graffiti. Many graffiti sketches 
overlap; it is reasonable to conclude that new additions of art have layered older sketches out of 
view. This rolling wave of covering the old biases the sample.  Given that all images were 
captured at the same time, we are more likely to observe recent graffiti, rather than old graffiti.  
 In addition, the accuracy of the time will vary based on my knowledge of the art. In some 
cases I was able to confirm the exact date the artist painted the street art by contacting the artist. 
In other cases I was able to determine the time range with street art was created, based on my 
familiarity with the street art in the area. In other cases the street art references a specific political 
issue popular during a specific time period. I was then able to determine when the art was created 
based on when this political issue was relevant.    
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Appendix B 
Operation Protective Edge: Ha’aretz Live Updates Analysis 
 I created the following table in order to analyze the increase in violence and subsequent 
increase in Israeli military and security apparatus presence during Operation Protective Edge, 
summer 2014. He Ha’aretz newspaper publication published live online updates, from the third 
day of Operation Protective Edge (July 10, 2014) through the fiftieth, and last official day of the 
operation (August 27, 2014). Table B.1 aggregates those live updates from Ha’aretz that are 
relevant to either increase in violence or increase or decrease in Israeli military and security 
presence, in Jerusalem. Table B.1 is comprised of two columns. The first column is the day of 
the operation. For instance, the first line of the Date column is labeled Day 1, and corresponds to 
August 25, 2014, the first day of Operation Protective Edge. The date corresponds to the second 
column, Events. Included in the Event column is are aggregated quotations, taken directly from 
the text of the online live updates that are relevant to Jerusalem. TO clarify, the Events column 
does not include every live updated published by Ha’aretz during the operation. Rather, the 
Events column includes only those updates that the author (I) deemed relevant to this study. 
When the live updates for a particular day could not be found at all the Events column is coded 
as ‘unavailable.’ If there were life updates for a certain day, however none of the live updates on 
that day were connected with Jerusalem, then the Events column is coded as ‘none.’ 
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Table B.1: Haaretz Live Updates Operation Protective Edge, July 10 - August 27, 2014, Jerusalem 
Related 
Day: Events: 
Day 1 none 
Day 2 none 
Day 3 Rockets fired hit Jerusalem area, Siren sounds in Jerusalem (Hamas claims responsibility) 
Day 4 
According to Gantz, the security apparatus will continue carrying out offensive operations, 
and that the IDF is "prepared to widen them when needed, with whatever force required and 
for as long as it takes." 
Day 5 
Riots erupt in East Jerusalem. In Issawiya, youths throw stones and firebombs at police 
forces. A fire breaks out in the area, not far from Hadassah Hospital, Mount Scopus. 
Firefighters are unable to arrive at the scene due to the continued clashes. In A- Tur and in 
Qalandiyah several dozens of youths are clashing with police, and throwing stones and 
firebombs.  
  
A firebomb was thrown at an Egged 962 bus, en route from Tiberias to Jerusalem on Route 
6, south of Eyal Junction. One of the bus' windows was shuttered. Medics treated several 
passengers for shock.  
  Rocket siren sounds  
Day 6 
A number of Palestinian men attacked and lightly wounded two Jewish men near 
Jerusalem's Old City, by Herod's Gate.  
  Sirens sound in Jerusalem 
  
Israel Police arrest 10 Arabs after clashes break out on the Temple Mount in the Old City of 
Jerusalem. Rioters hurled stones at the officers, wounding two.  
Day 7 
About 100 right-wingers gather in Jerusalem city center ahead of a march to Damascus Gate 
in the Old City, intended to "show the Arab's who's boss," according to the protest's event 
page on Facebook. Police are present in large forces, including elite units and undercover 
police. About 20 leftist activists are at the scene to stage a counter-protest. Verbal 
altercations between the sides have developed.  
  
Police arrested 36 people on Sunday on suspicion of disturbing the peace, throwing rocks 
and hurling firebombs in Jerusalem. 165 people have been arrested so far on similar 
suspicions, including 44 minors.  
Day 8 Stone-throwers target light train in Jerusalem; none injured, train lightly damaged 
  Rockets sound in Jerusalem 
Day 9 none 
Day 10 
Clashes in East Jerusalem: Palestinians threw stones at a passing train in the Shoafat 
neighborhood this morning. No injuries were reported. 
  
Two Palestinians arrested overnight in East Jerusalem, suspected of throwing stones. 
Another three Palestinians suspected of attacking a Jewish man in the Muslim Quarter were 
also arrested. The victim did not require medical treatment. 
  
An additional 21 Palestinians suspected involvement in Jerusalem riots over the last two 
weeks were also arrested overnight. 201 Palestinians have been arrested over the past two 
months, 45 of whom have been formally charged. Police expect to make further arrests. 
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  Sirens sound in Jerusalem Hill area 
Day 11 
Home Front Command prohibits gatherings of over 1,000 people in open areas 40-80 
kilometers from the Gaza Strip, a perimeter which includes Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.  
Day 12 none 
Day 13 none 
Day 14 Clashes in East Jerusalem 
  Sirens sound in Jerusalem Hill area 
Day 15 
Masked Palestinians clash with police in East Jerusalem; rioters throwing rocks, molotov 
cocktails. Police respond with riot- control measures. No injuries reported  
Day 16 none 
Day 17 
12 Palestinians were arrested for causing disturbances around Jerusalem. Thursday night is 
Laylat al-Qadr according to Muslim tradition, one of the most important nights in the month 
of Ramadan.  
  
Two Palestinians were killed near the Qalandiyah checkpoint in the West Bank and over 
200 were wounded, many of them by live IDF fire, when some 10,000 protesters marched 
from Ramallah toward Jerusalem late on Thursday night. Israeli authorities say live fire was 
fired at IDF troops from with the crowd. Four Palestinians have been killed during Friday 
demonstrations.  
  
Police and security officials are concerned that the combination of the holiday and the 
fighting in Gaza will lead to widespread disturbances in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  
  
Thousands of police officers and border police have spread across the capital. The special 
deployment will last until the end of Friday prayers  
  
Israel to bar Palestinians under 50 from entering Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem during 
Friday prayers, fearing clashes.  
Day 18 
According to the Jerusalem Police, during the disturbances in the city yesterday 39 suspects 
were arrested and 27 police and border police were lightly wounded.  
  
This morning thousands of police and border police have been positioned on the Temple 
Mount, in the Old City and in east Jerusalem. Only men above the age of 50 as well as 
women of any age will be admitted to prayers at the mosques on the Temple Mount.  
  Palestinians in East Jerusalem report dozens wounded, including four wounded by gunfire.  
  39 Palestinian rioters arrested by police 
Day 19 
Meanwhile, Palestinian protesters and Israeli security forces continued to clash in the West 
Bank  
Day 20 none 
Day 21 
Dozens of masked men are throwing stones and firebombs at police forces in Isawiyah, 
Jerusalem, the police spokesperson reported.  
Day 22 unavailable 
Day 23 none 
Day 24 none 
Day 25 
IDF is preparing for violent protests in the West Bank today, the first Friday since the 
ending of the month of Ramadan  
  Heavy police presence is being felt in Jerusalem.  
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Day 26 none 
Day 27 none 
Day 28 Police beefing up presence on Jerusalem's seam zone  
  
contingents of police from outside capital annexed to Jerusalem forces, positioned at friction 
points between Jewish, Arab portions of city.  
  
Gunman on motorcycle opens fire at bus stop by Jerusalem's Hebrew University in Mt. 
Scopus. One man seriously wounded. Security forces attempting to apprehend attacker.  
  
A man has rammed a digger into a bus in the Shmuel Hanavi neighborhood in Jerusalem. 
The digger driver was shot dead by the police.  
  
Dozens of masked Arab youths hurl rocks and firecrackers at cops at the Mugrabi Gate near 
the Western Wall in Jerusalem. The police chased the assailants toward the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque, managing to contain the violence by locking the rock- throwers in the house of 
worship. Five police officers were lightly wounded in the clash.  
Day 29 
A security guard was moderately wounded Tuesday afternoon in stabbing attack near the 
police station at the entrance to Ma'aleh Adumim, near Jerusalem. Police suspect terrorist 
motive. The guard, in his mid-50s, open fired on the assailant but missed the target. The 
assailant managed to escape to the village Azaria nearby.  
Day 30 unavailable 
Day 31 unavailable 
Day 32 unavailable 
Day 33 
According to the instructions issued by the IDF's Home Front Command yesterday, 
gatherings of over 1,000 people in open areas are not permitted anywhere within 40-80 
kilometers of the Strip's perimeter. Both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv fall into that category  
  
In areas within 40 kilometers of the Strip, public gathering of over 500 people are forbidden, 
both oin open areas and within closed spaces.  
Day 34 none 
Day 35 none 
Day 36 none 
Day 37 none 
Day 38 
IDF forces arrest 20 Palestinians overnight in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Among 
them are two suspected Hamas operatives, arrested in Beit Lakia and Qalandia.  
Day 39 none 
Day 40 none 
Day 41 unavailable 
Day 42 none 
Day 43 Rocket siren sounds in Jerusalem 
  Rocket siren sounds in Jerusalem 
Day 44 
According to the IDF, over 150 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel from Gaza, 
targeting the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas as well as the south.  
  A rocket explodes in an open area in the Jerusalem region  
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Bibi in Speech: "We've dismantled its abilities in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and its 
attempts to stage a coup there. We're determined to pursue the campaign with all means at 
our disposal and we won't stop.  
Day 45 Eleven Palestinians arrested in West Bank overnight 
  First round of Israel's Premier League soccer games postponed due to security situation 
  
The defense minister asked the public for patience and fortitude, saying " the operation will 
be long and the goal is one: to return quiet and security to the people of Israel in general and 
the residents of the south in particular. We will not compromise."  
Day 46 none 
Day 47 
A 20-year-old Palestinian is in serious condition after an exchange of fire with Israel Police 
in Jerusalem on Friday. According to the police, a special police unit spotted gun fire from 
the Shoafat Refugee Camp toward the Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood, and returned fire, 
confirming a hit. The suspected Palestinian youth is currently hospitalized in the Hadassah 
University Hospital, Ein Karem, in Jerusalem.  
  
According to the police, the incident followed another shooting incident toward Pisgat 
Ze'ev, after which the special unit was deployed in the area.  
Day 48 Sirens sound in Jerusalem 
Day 49 
Three children have been lightly injured by stones thrown at an Israeli car in the East 
Jerusalem neighborhood of Wadi Joz. They were taken for treatment. Border Police 
captured one of the masked assailants, who admitted to being involved in the incident, 
according to police.  
  
There have also been clashes between police and Palestinians youths in Silwan and Shoefat, 
according to Palestinian sources. Operations of the light railway in Shoefat have been 
suspended after three incidents, including one in which a molotov cocktail was thrown.  
  
Firebomb thrown at Jerusalem light rail in Shoafat area of East Jerusalem, damaging the 
train.  





List and Description of Interview Subjects, and Informal Conversations 
Table C.1 Formal and Informal Interview Subjects 
Pseudo name  Position: Interaction: 
Ron  City Planning Official In-person formal interview  
Omer  Jerusalem Street artist, photographer In-personal formal interview 
Barel and Souza Street Artists, responsible for the 
Mahane Yehuda murals 
In-person formal interview 
Ami  Musician, previously performed on 
the streets of Jerusalem 
In-person formal interview  
Lev  Student in Jerusalem, familiar with 
Jerusalem street art culture 
In-person formal interview 
Shira  Street artists from Jerusalem, now 
based in Tel Aviv 
Telephone informal interview 
Rotem Jerusalem based street artist, and 
head of artist collective  
In-person formal interview 
Maya  Jerusalem Foundation Staff Member In-person informal interview  
Tamar  Mekudeshet Staff Member In-person informal interview  
Moshe  Jerusalem Resident, Young Adult In-person informal 
conversation 









Image One:  Souza, Solomon and Hahn, Berel, Portrait of Albert Einstein (2016) on shop  
  shutter  in Mahaneh Yehuda Market Place, (Source: Renee Ghert-Zand).    
 
 
Image Two:  Souza, Solomon and Hahn, Berel, Portrait of Maimonides. 2015, on shop shutter  
  in Mahaneh Yehuda Market Place, (Source: Lital Yeshurtun Photography).    
 
 
Image Three:  Solomon Souza and Berel Hahn, Portrait of Lucy Aharish (February, 2016) on  




Image Four:  Stencil graffiti of Moshe Dayan (date of origin 2008), (image captured by Ellie  
  Neustein, August 2017).  
 
 
Image Five:  Image of ‘Na Nach’ tag (date unknown)- a popular reference to a song about the  




Image Six:  Images of Elementary Arabic words with Hebrew Phonetic Spelling in Katamon  
  neighborhood (2016) (images captured by Ellie Neustein, 8/6/2017) 
6.a:                    6.b:                           6.c: 
     
           
 
Table D.1: Image of Elementary Arabic words with Hebrew Phonetic 






















































Image Seven:  Nir Barkat Graffiti on Electrical Box (2013), (image captured by Ellie Neustein,  
  August 2017). 
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Image Eight: The Caesar to Caesarea (2015), (image captured by Ellie Neustein, August 2017,  
  near Prime Minister’s Residence). 
 
Chapter Four 
Image Nine: Walls at the Miphal, artists unknown (images captured by Ellie Neustein, March 
2018) 
9.a ‘Map’ on Hamifal wall  9.b Decorated wall of  Hamifal    9.c Painting on Hamifal wall 
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Appendix E 
Event Key  
Referred to as in the context of this study: Also known as: 
The War of 1967, or The 1967 War The Six Day War 
The War of 1948, or The 1948 War War of Independence, The Catastrophe, al-nakba 
Judea Samaria  The West Bank, The Contested Territories 
Operation Protective Edge The Gaza War, The Gaza Conflict, Tzuk Eitan 
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